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In this paper I will explore the tension that arises when we describe ourselves as intentional 
beings, on one side, and biological or physical beings on the other. That is, I will take a closer 
look at the age old problem of how the mind relates to the brain. More specifically, I will take a 
look at the relation between the scientific explanations of the mind and the commonsensical 
framework we rely on to describe mental phenomena, what is often called Folk Psychology.   
During the past twenty years more has been learned about the brain and how it works 
than ever before. Armed with all this new information cognitive researchers and neurologists 
have been attacking questions that until recently were reserved for philosophers: the questions 
of what consciousness really is (or the neural correlate of consciousness as some neurologists 
have dubbed it), the question of the mind-body relation and the problem of self-identity. This 
research has produced a host of books that are written to deal with the old mind-body problem 
in light of the new research.1 Some of these are written by neurologists with no philosophical 
training and few philosophical aspirations – and are quite unconvincing when they try to draw 
philosophical implications of the research program – and some are written with a more 
philosophical program in mind. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: there is an interesting and 
important exchange of ideas, empirical discoveries, and theoretical frameworks between 
philosophy and neuroscience. Just as neurologists are eager to engage in philosophical 
speculation on the fundamental workings of the mental, philosophers have been eager to 
incorporate the findings of the neurosciences in their own projects of trying to elucidate how 
the mind works. 
A landmark in this respect is Patricia Churchland’s aptly named book Neurophilosophy 
(1986). This was perhaps the first serious attempt at integrating philosophical theory with the 
new findings of neurology. In this paper I will take a closer look at the interplay between these 
disciplines and try to point out some of the salient features making up the interface between 
them.  
At first glance it might seem that theorizing is the task of philosophy, while making new 
empirical data available would be up to the neuroscientist. This, although true to a certain 
extent, is, I believe, a much too crude division of labor. A main idea in this paper is that 
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empirical findings and conceptual tools are interdependent, modulating each other as they go 
along. This interdependency of data and theory – of the observed and the framework into which 
it is fitted – is nothing new; it has long been the accepted view in philosophy of science. The 
reason for stressing the point here is that when it comes to the mind and its relation to the brain, 
it might seem that philosophers and neuroscientist have been surprisingly slow to catch on.2 
The subjective states, our pains, beliefs, desires, emotions, reasons, hopes and fears, are readily 
available to scrutiny by introspection and seem to be outside the grasp of the neurosciences. 
When it comes to our inner lives we are playing on home field and no one is to tell us what, for 
instance, our feelings really are. Tempers run high when the idea that mental phenomena can be 
given a physical description is raised. There is, the argument runs, something special about the 
private and subjective feel of our mental workings and consciousness that can never be 
captured by a third, more or less objective, party such as the neurosciences. In the lingo of the 
philosopher: we seem to have privileged access to our own subjective states.  
However, if the neurosciences are ready to embark upon the problem of the mind, are 
there any reasons for philosophers to pursue the same problems? Is it not time to let “hard” 
science take charge? Or to put it another way: is it possible to separate the philosophical 
questions from the scientific? In order to get a grip on these issues I will examine the following 
questions: how do the methods and goals of neuroscience and of philosophy relate to one 
another? Is the intentional vocabulary (and Folk Psychology) compatible with that of 
neuroscience or will a mature neuroscience do away with the intentional vocabulary, e.g. 
beliefs, desires etc? If not, what are the reasons for keeping the intentional vocabulary?  
There are two reasons, I think, why philosophy cannot let neuroscience do the work 
alone, at least not at this stage. The first reason has to do with the maturity of cognitive science 
and neuroscience. Although we have made tremendous progress in brain imaging and scanning 
techniques, in cognitive research and computational models for linking the neural with the 
cognitive, there are still a lot of questions that cannot be settled by empirical research alone 
(and for sure, there are still questions that we have not yet begun to formulate). What is needed 
is a place where theories can be pitched against each other and where the logical structure of 
those can be measured; a place where no theory is sacred and where it is acceptable to “kick the 
lives of every governing paradigm, examine every sacred cow, and peer behind the curtains of 
every magic show”.3 Philosophy provides such a tumbling place. Furthermore, the rapidly 
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growing amount of data gathered by neuroscientists does not come with a ready theoretical 
framework in which it can be placed.  
 The second and more substantial reason has deeper roots, and is one I suspect will not 
be easily disposed of. It has to do with the way the physical vocabulary (in this case the 
neurophysical) resists matching up with the mental (the intentional vocabulary) in a systematic, 
one-to-one fashion. This has to do with the interests we have in the explanations those 
vocabularies provide. I suspect, with Davidson, Dennett and Rorty, that there is no way to 
translate features under description in one vocabulary into descriptions of the other without 
losing something – or quite a lot – in the translation. In this paper I will look into the possibility 
that two vocabularies, the mental and the physical, can exist side by side without opening for 
ontological or metaphysical dualism. 
There seems to be a metaphysical bias in the current discussion of the mind-body 
relation: either the commonsense conception of the mental is rendered acceptable in 
physicalistic terms – the reductive alternative – or the conception is to be eliminated altogether 
– the eliminativist position. Both these are attempts at taking physicalism seriously, and the 
current view is that if you reject physicalism the only alternative is some sort of unpalatable 
mysticism. One of these mysticisms is, of course, Cartesian dualism, where the mental realm is 
ontologically distinct from the physical.  
The approach taken in this paper is naturalistic through and through. A minimal 
definition of naturalism is that mental phenomena can be explained as part of the natural order 
and are empirically accessible features of the world. There are different ways of interpreting 
what this means, and the versions of naturalism vary from the strong realistic kind, to the more 
relaxed pragmatic stance. The strong realist is someone who holds that every property 
supervenes on physical phenomena and that all events (or objects) are identical to, composed of 
or reducible to physical events (or objects). At the other end of the spectrum the pragmatist 
holds that the mode of inquiry of the physical sciences will provide theoretical understanding of 
the world, to the extent that this sort of understanding can be achieved, and that this mode of 
inquiry may also turn out fruitful in the special sciences. The only requirement is that there is 
some explanatory link between the special sciences and the vocabulary of physics. This 
explanatory link need not be reductive; examples of such non-reductive explanatory links are 
the link between biology and physics and between geology and physics. In both these cases 
there is a link between the different explanations, but there is little hope in reducing, say, 
biology to physics.  
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 In order to get a better grip on the tension between mental and physical descriptions I 
will start the discussion, in chapter two, with a closer look at what it means to explain the same 
object, the brain, as two different kinds of thing.  
The pragmatic kind of naturalism endorsed in this paper draws on the idea that different 
vocabularies instantiate different interests and commitments. In the third chapter I take a closer 
look at this notion. The vocabulary-vocabulary as Brandom has dubbed it allows you to talk 
about mental properties and physical properties without assuming the ontological primacy of 
the one over the other. This gives accesses to naturalism “without taking the route through 
nomological or conceptual reduction.”4 Since the idea of vocabularies is significant to this 
paper I will devote some time to explaining the central idea behind it and lay down some of it 
central virtues (and perhaps search for some flaws) and spell out how it stands in relation to 
more traditional approaches to the mind-body problem. As the idea is elaborated it will be clear 
that it helps to fend off some major metaphysical and ontological problems inherent in the more 
orthodox approaches to the mind.  
I then proceed, in the fourth chapter, to evaluate a position that is intended to remove the 
tension by arguing that the intentional vocabulary is widely erroneous. This is the eliminative 
materialism of Paul and Patricia Churchland. They claim that the intentional vocabulary, or 
Folk Psychology as they call it, fail to meet up with the current findings of neuroscience and 
consequently should be eliminated. I assess their position by first stating what they mean by 
eliminativism and then examine five different objections against their position. The reason for 
examining these objections is to determine what opposing sides in the debate sees as the 
important elements in the commonsensical and in the scientific description of our mental lives. 
In essence the Churchlands claim that the commonsensical framework of the mental will have 
to adapt according to the findings of neuroscience. 
The purpose of scientific explanation will be discussed further in the fifth chapter. For 
this purpose I turn to Paul Griffiths’ new and more flexible account of natural kinds. Natural 
kinds play an important role in scientific explanations; they are involved in the central scientific 
features of induction and prediction. The function of natural kinds is traditionally taken to be 
“to cut nature at its joints” or to capture the real essence of the members making up the kind. 
Griffiths thinks, on the other hand, that the traditional view on natural kinds, with universal 
exceptionless laws, is too rigid to be of much help to science. He has developed a new account 
of natural kinds that is supposed to better capture the intended function of scientific terms. He 
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wants to leave the idea of natural kinds as the most fundamental category of nature and instead 
view them as non-arbitrary ways of classifying the subject matter under examination. He uses 
his findings to argue that the vernacular concept of emotion does not form a single natural kind 
and concludes that it has to be eliminated in favor of a better informed theory of emotion.   
In the next chapter, the sixth, I compare and contrast the different reasons the 
Churchlands and Griffiths hold for arriving at the eliminativist conclusion. In this chapter I will 
also take a look at the normative role the intentional vocabulary plays, since this is something 
they seem to disagree about.  
The final chapter summarizes some of the lessons learned, and offers some general 
observations on the pragmatic approach that I am endorsing.  
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2. Different Ways of Describing the Same Thing 
 
 
Robot: With all your modern science, are you any closer to 
understanding the mystery of how a robot walks or talks? 
Professor Farnsworth: Yes you idiot! The circuit diagram is 
right here on the inside of your case. 
Robot: I choose to believe what I was programmed to 
believe! 
 
- “The Honking”, Futurama5  
 
The two last decades of the twentieth century saw an explosion of means and tools for studying 
the brain in more detail. For the first time it is possible to measure brain activity of a person, by 
non-invasive means, while the subject is still awake and responding. New techniques as 
positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reveal 
which brain areas are activated when an individual performs a particular task; 
electroencephalographs (EEG) and magnetoencephalographs (MEG) provide detailed 
information about the time course of brain processing. 
Before these tools were developed researchers had to meticulously note all behavioral 
deficits of a subject, wait for the post mortem autopsy, and then try to correlate the observed 
behavioral deficits with damaged brain tissue. Still, with only these crude methods of 
investigation some correlations between mental functions and the brain were possible to 
establish. Broca’s work on persons with speech impairments due to head injury in the 1850’s 
was perhaps the first respectable evidence for cortical localization of function. He was able to 
conclude that a specific region of the brain is responsible for the production of fluent speech. 
With the new tools at hand cognitive psychologists, cognitive scientists, and 
neuroscientists have launched a special epistemic project: to capture mental and subjective 
phenomena in a scientific language. The idea is to develop systematic and well-supported 
models of the operations occurring in the brain as people are experiencing different emotions 
and as they are carrying out a variety of different cognitive tasks including categorization, 
problem solving, recognition, and recalling.  
At this point it is possible to discern at least three different levels of explanations 
involved in a scientific theory of the mental.6 The top level is where the evolutionary history of 
cognitive development is seen most explicitly. It should include such things as ecological 
pressure and cognitive improvement. It probably should also include an explanation of the role 
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cognition and consciousness has in culture. This is the level of task description and involves 
explanation of what a given trait does for the organism. Research at this level is supported by 
the increasing flow of data emerging from cognitive ethology. The intermediate level is the 
level of computations. This should include an account of representation and how information is 
processed to accomplish the task described at the previous level. The lowest level is the 
neuronal underpinning of mental and cognitive abilities. This is where the work of 
neuroscientist bears most weight.7  This level is where the answer to the question of how 
computations are physically implemented should be formulated.  
Taken as scientific programs, these levels of description do not seem to be at odds with 
each other. But with the realization that what is being explained here are mental phenomena – 
our subjective experiences, emotions, beliefs, and desires – and social and moral knowledge, a 
sneaking suspicion that something is missing may arise. How can a theory couched in scientific 
terms explain the myriad of subjective states, phenomenal experiences and moral knowledge? 
As Paul Churchland notes: “Inevitably, these sentiments will evoke discomfort in some readers, 
as if, by being located in the purely physical brain, social and moral knowledge were about to 
be devalued in some way.”8 With the suspicion of devaluation follows the conviction that there 
is something special about the mental and about moral knowledge. This seems to be knowledge 
that cannot be explained by a biologically or physically based science.  
Among cognitive scientists and neurologists, on the other hand, this epistemic project is 
based on a firm belief that mental phenomena can be given a naturalistic explanation. That is, 
they believe that the mental can be explained without resort to super-natural entities, and they 
usually deny that there is a metaphysical distinction between the mind and the brain. From their 
point of view, cognitive and mental properties are subject to empirical studies and biological 
explanations.  
LeDoux assures us that “[b]rain circuits and psychological experiences are not different 
things, but rather, different ways of describing the same thing”9. This, of course, is not a new 
sentiment. Ryle wrote in The Concept of Mind:  
 
“He is bodily active and he is mentally active, but he is not being synchronously active 
in two different ‘places’ or with two different ‘engines’. There is one activity, but it is 
one susceptible of and requiring more than one kind of explanatory description”10 
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At first glance it might seem trivial to say that what we are talking about are not two 
different objects, but rather two descriptions of the same object, but at the same time it seems to 
be at odds with the natural tendency to think that ontologically speaking the mental and the 
physical are different things. And this way of formulating the relation between mind and brain 
raises a couple of important questions. What does it mean to describe the same object in 
different ways? What counts as a description? And, “How, to come to the point, do we know 
where we have two ways of talking about the same thing […] rather than descriptions of two 
different things?”11 In this paper I will pursue, and sketch some possible answers to these 
questions.  
If the difference lies at the explanatory level, it is most likely an epistemic problem rater 
than an ontological one. A pressing challenge will be to explain how to understand the relation 
between a scientific approach to the mental and other ways of learning about the mental (for 
instance, by introspection). The main philosophical task will be to articulate what the real 
differences between the explanations consist of and how they affect each other. The reasons 
against any hope for clean-cut intertheoretic reduction between the levels are many and 
substantial, but this does not mean that the different descriptive levels are independent. On the 
contrary it is vital that findings on one level should be reflected on the other levels. (And this 
has in fact happened several times during the “history of the brain” as when phrenologists had 
to abandon their work when it was found that the lumps on the scull did not match the 
functional roles of the cortex below the scull.) 
One important part of this paper will be to articulate what is gained by keeping both 
levels of description – the neurological and the psychological – and give reasons for not opting 
for the eliminativist strategy; that is, I will try to show that the mental vocabulary, the 
commonsensical framework of the mental, plays an important role in describing human 
behavior, and that it might be indispensable. Another significant part will be to examine when 
keeping different descriptions of one domain adds something to the overall explanation, and 
when it just leads to confusion. 
The full account of a human and her faculties involves not just a physical description, 
but also her relation to other humans, her place in the social nexus. By eradicating the 
intentional vocabulary an essential part of the description of a human being would disappear. A 
more appealing approach would perhaps be to try to reduce the mental description to a physical 
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one, but this is only feasible if there is a one-to-one match between the terms of the mental 
vocabulary and that of the physical. This seems highly unlikely since the patterns picked out by 
the different vocabularies reflect different interests, and the one-to-one match would imply that 
the interest spelled out in the mental vocabulary and the physical vocabulary should be identical. 
This, of course, is by no means true.12 The mental vocabulary captures the macro-activity of 
humans in a way that, it seems, could never be captured by the fine-grained vocabulary of the 
physical sciences. 
I start off with the idea of different explanations belonging to different vocabularies, and 
as such reflect divergent interests. The notion of different vocabularies serving different 
purposes is an elaboration of the distinction between the mental and the physical Donald 
Davidson argued for in “Mental Events”.13 His strategy did provide a useful way of perceiving 
the relation between the mental and the physical, but as Ramberg (2004) argues, Davidson’s 
characterization of the mental is not suited to elucidate the current conceptual dynamics 
between the natural sciences and other ways of obtaining knowledge about our subjective and 
moral life (philosophy, psychology, ethics, anthropology, etc.). What Davidson does provide, 
though, is a rewarding way of looking at the relation between the mind and body as a difference 
in ways of describing the same thing, by referring to different vocabularies as the means to 
express different interests, without assuming that one of them has ontological primacy. This 
idea was further developed by Rorty (1979, 1989) and Brandom (2002, pp. 156-182). The 
vocabulary-vocabulary, as Brandom has dubbed this idea, is the subject of the next chapter.  
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 Not true at the present, at least. However, seeing as the development of vocabularies is contingent on our 
interests it is important to keep an open mind when it comes to revision of those vocabularies. 
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 Davidson (1970): “What does it mean to say that an event is mental or physical? One natural answer is that an 




3. Rorty and Vocabularies 
 
Almost as soon as I began to study philosophy, I was 
impressed by the way in which philosophical problems 
appeared, disappeared, or changed shape, as a result of 
new assumptions or vocabularies. 
 
- Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the mirror of Nature14 
 
The passage above is taken from the opening of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature15 by 
Richard Rorty. In this book he began to formulate his historicist, anti-Platonic world view. The 
idea that vocabularies are both non-compulsory and changeable was the driving force of his 
attack on the representationalist epistemology in this work, and was developed further in “The 
Contingency of Language” from Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.16 Here he argued that there 
is no way to make the notion of truth dependent on something in the world corresponding to 
our description of that very thing. The argument runs in three steps: i) truth is a property of 
sentences; what is to be assessed as true or false has to be expressed in a sentence, ii) sentences 
have meaning only within a corpus of other sentences; a vocabulary or a language, iii) 
vocabularies are products of human activity. From these three premises Rorty concludes that 
truth itself is a product of human activity and not something “out there” awaiting our discovery, 
as had been the prevailing view throughout the history of Western philosophy. Reciting the 
pragmatist slogan that what makes no difference to practice should make no difference to 
philosophy, Rorty maintains that there is no essential distinction between justification and truth. 
The notion of truth and correspondence has to go since “[…] assessment of truth and 
assessment of justification are, when the question is about what I should believe now, the same 
activity.”17 
What matters for the pragmatist, then, is not whether our beliefs correspond to some 
parts of reality, i.e. whether they “are true”, by reference to the world, but whether their role in 
our vocabularies makes a practical difference. That is, if you “drop the idea that some of our 
schemes are distinguished by such correspondence, as Davidson has, it seems natural to say, as 
Dewey and Wittgenstein did, that all our idioms are tools for coping with the world.”18 Rorty 
wants to see the “classical” notion of truth removed form the philosophical discussion. 
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At the heart of the notion of vocabularies, our idioms for coping with the world, is the 
rejection of the Kantian idea of a linguistic practice that sharply distinguishes between 
languages, as structures of meaning, and theories, as structures of beliefs; by appeal to the 
concept of vocabularies there is no longer a way to make a substantial difference between 
meaning and belief.19 For Rorty and the pragmatist there is no way to make a distinction 
between the language game we engage in and the world we try to capture in that game.20  
It is possible to single out several different vocabularies that serve different functions. 
For our purpose the important vocabularies are that of the mind – I will also refer to it as the 
intentional vocabulary or the mental vocabulary and later also as Folk Psychology; all seem to 
pick out more or less the same sort of phenomena – and the physical vocabulary, which is 
roughly the vocabulary of scientific explanation and the physical sciences. The physical 
vocabulary strives to become an “ultimate vocabulary” where strong laws operate. The 
generalizations of the physical sciences must be lawlike to be projectible and to be used in 
induction. The mental (or intentional) vocabulary on the other hand is not, on the face of it, 
committed to a program of projectability and induction of the same kind as the physical 
vocabulary. It is intended to capture the meaningful behavior of rational agents and in this 
respect it is ultimately a teleological vocabulary. The intentional vocabulary incorporates a 
complex pattern of beliefs, desires, intentions, predictions of other people’s behavior, etc. This 
makes it the basis of our everyday understanding of human behavior. Nevertheless, there is a 
discussion raging over the status of the intentional vocabulary. The Churchlands, as we will see 
in chapter 4, argue that the intentional vocabulary, which they (and many others with them) 
refer to as Folk Psychology, is a theoretical vocabulary and as such should be held to the same 
standards as any other scientific vocabulary.  
In this metaphilosophical context the traditional mind-body problem can be viewed as a 
tension between vocabularies and interests, rather than as a problem of our scientific practice or 
our ontological commitments (although the way we perceive a vocabulary closely reflects our 
ontological preferences). A better way of perceiving the different vocabularies and how they 
are interconnected would also reduce the tension between a “greening neuroscience and a 
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 That is, there is a difference between meaning and belief, but this is a pragmatic difference, not a principled or 
substantial one. Sometimes it is useful to “keep one factor constant” and talk about the other factor, in order to be 
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Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1957), reprint (1997)) 
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graying philosophy.”21 Of course, to say this much is only to point at what I take to be a proper 
solution to the mind-body problem. In order to get a better grip on the problem and the 
proposed (dis-)solution I will try to flesh out the details of the vocabulary-vocabulary and relate 
it to the more orthodox views of dualism, eliminativism and reductionism. It might also be 
demanded that it be defended against claims of relativism. That is, it might be that someone 
might claim that “since vocabularies, and thus truths, are dependent on humans, and 
specifically the vocabularies they use, anything will be possible; it is just a matter of changing 
vocabularies”. This postmodernist claim, I will argue, is not implied by the vocabulary-
vocabulary.  
 
The Vocabulary-Vocabulary  
The idea of the vocabulary-vocabulary is intended to provide new means “for organizing our 
thinking about our cognitive and practical activity as knowers and agents”.22 As Whorf noted:  
 
“[…] we cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do 
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way, an agreement 
that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our 
language”23 
  
But it is not just that we are parties to an agreement, it is also an important part of our 
biological nature:  
 
“[…] there is a deep connection between how the mind works and how we perceive the 
world works. We are pattern seeking animals, the descendants of hominids who were 
especially dexterous at making causal links between events in nature. The associations 
were real often enough that the ability became engrained in our neural architecture”24 
 
Concepts and categories in this way sort out the patterns in the world and they in turn 
make up the central parts of vocabularies. Changes in those very concepts come about largely 
through interest conflicts, both when we are faced with new phenomena and when we face old 
phenomena in a new way. This natural tendency to group salient features into concepts and 
categories is captured by the pragmatic tool of vocabularies. The idea is that different 
vocabularies will pick out different patterns, and that what ultimately is considered as a pattern 
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in turn is guided by our interest in the world. We do not construct patterns, they are already 
there, but by using a vocabulary we “choose” which patterns we take to be salient. The 
application of a vocabulary makes certain patterns emerge, but at the same time patterns make 
us select a specific vocabulary. As a result, terminological choices guide those patterns that 
appear. But this does not imply that the vocabularies are chosen or progress at random. There 
are several constraints on the development of vocabularies.  
Rorty views vocabularies as different narrations about who we are. Both vocabularies 
that typically consist of physical descriptions and causal regularities, and the vocabulary that 
consists of the intentional terms is important in making the full story of who we are.  He does 
not see that one kind of vocabulary should have any (metaphysical or logical) precedence in 
capturing our subjective states. (Quine on the other hand has a bias for the scientific 
vocabularies. They are, in his view, best suited to capture the regularities of the world and our 
place in it.) The question then becomes whether the needs and interest of neuroscience match 
up with those expressed by the intentional vocabulary. Or to put it the other way around: are the 
needs and interests we articulate in the intentional vocabulary best answered and met by a 
mature neuroscience, or are there other things at stake here? Once again the question “what 
counts as an explanation of the relation between mind and body” seems to be left unanswered. 
The vocabulary-vocabulary provides means to spell out how those interests are linked 
with the categories we apply when we describe and talk about the world. Incorporating 
metaphors, and turning them into integral parts of how we conceive the world is the central 
working method of the pragmatist. “To implement a metaphorical expression […] is to work up 
a complex context of theoretical and empirical use for the expression in such a way that the 
metaphor is sent on its ways towards literalization”25 The holistic core of pragmatism implies 
that theoretical and empirical considerations go hand in hand; there is little hope in trying to 
untie the conceptual knots prior to any empirical considerations have been made.  
The intellectual development of a vocabulary will never reach a point where the 
vocabulary is freed of all metaphors and interests. This means that there is no such thing as a 
neutral vocabulary; as already mentioned the formation of a vocabulary is to a large degree 
dependent on our own interests and it is reasonable to claim that all human activity involves 
interest in one way or another. 
It is important to stress this close relation between the vocabularies we use to frame 
certain problems and the interest we have in those very problems, or what might be said to 
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constitute an answer to the question posed. This reflects the anti-essentialism which Quine 
argued for in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”:26 there is no way to separate what a person is 
talking about and what they are saying about it by reference to the essence of the object being 
discussed. Instead, metaphors and characteristics govern what kind of questions we are inclined 
to ask and what we regard as answers to those questions; in this way the choice and use of a 
vocabulary closely reflects our interest.  
There are factors involved in the process of deciding which vocabulary currently is best 
suited for the explanatorily needs for a domain, but they might not be transferable to other 
conflicts, and they are not provided by the world. Our interests in different aspects of a domain 
and the way we talk about it govern the development of the vocabulary. The interplay between 
the ways we ask questions, how we ask them, and what we take to be answers to them are the 
important guidelines in the development of a vocabulary. However, this does not open the door 
for rampant relativism since the world is involved, too. It does not provide criteria for choice of 
vocabulary, but what sort of criteria we apply will depend on how it is useful for us to engage 
the world. And that does depend on how the world actually is. Not every kind of vocabulary 
will be suitable in any give situation; objectivity is not exchanged with subjectivity. “The moral 
is not that objective criteria for choice of vocabulary are to be replaced with subjective criteria, 
reason with will or feeling. It is rather that the notion of criteria and choice (including that of 
“arbitrary” choice) are no longer in point when it comes to changes from one language game to 
another”27  
First, we are not at liberty to change vocabulary; secondly, there are mechanisms at play 
when a vocabulary changes. The idea of changing vocabulary at depends on the scope of the 
vocabulary That is, we are at the mercy of our concepts, in some sense, but not completely, and 
less so at the delineated, theoretical end of the vocabulary spectrum. It depends on the scope – 
adequately defined highly theoretical vocabularies can be treated pretty much as tools in this 
respect.  We can choose whether to pick out some referent by means of spatial coordinates, or 
by means of a qualitative description. But we cannot randomly substitute one word with 
another and assume that what we say when we use the new word will make sense to others. 
Consider this famous exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:  
  
“And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!” 
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,” Alice said. 
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Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t – till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s 
a knock down argument for you!’” 
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knockdown argument’,” Alice objected. 
“When I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I 
choose it to mean – neither more nor less.” 
“The question is”, said Alice, “whether you can make word mean so many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”28  
 
The point is that no one can proclaim themselves master of the use of a word. For the 
pragmatist (who takes her lesson from the later Wittgenstein) to grasp the content of a concept 
is mastery of the use of the corresponding word in a language or in a vocabulary. Concepts are 
thus holistically constrained by the vocabulary they are part of. The pragmatist in this manner is 
doubtful that anyone can grasp the content of a single word in isolation; it is only by the 
framework of a vocabulary that a concept gets it meaning (i.e. it would seem impossible to 
entertain the concept ‘DOG’ without knowing how to make use of the word in conjunction with 
a lot of other words – both dog-related (as in ‘dogs bark’) and those not directly related to dogs 
– and to utilize it in inferences assessable as correct or incorrect). But the pragmatist takes the 
holistic constraint to mean that there is no way to separate the logical, or conceptual, part of a 
vocabulary from the empirical part. There is, in addition, some sort of normative constraint on 
the words and the vocabularies we employ; to engage in a language-game is to share a common 
backdrop of commitments. And a person not willing to participate in this game, who insists on 
playing by his own rules, will not be considered rational.29 
At the heart of the pragmatic notion of vocabularies is a wish to reformulate and 
transform the way we speak about the world. New metaphors and new ways of using words are 
chief methods in achieving such changes. But, “the rhetorical transformation sought by the 
pragmatist philosopher is not, it is crucial to stress, an attempt to change the world by wishing it 
different, not a species of an idealism which mistakes linguistic change for substantive change 
in the world.”30  
However, changes in the way we speak is not the same as affecting how the world is, 
but rather “[…] what is affected, when the pragmatist succeeds, are the ways in which features 
of the world are salient to us and so the nature of patterns of the responses which events in the 
world elicit from us. In a word; what is changed is a complex subset of our causal 
dispositions.”31 A myriad of contingent, causal factors can contribute, some of them mundane – 
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like having “gradually lost the habit of using certain words and gradually acquired the habit of 
using others.”32 But often these contingent, causal factors are anything but mundane. They 
provide an important link between the objects being described and the vocabulary in which we 
try to describe them. We are constrained causally by the world, and this has consequences for 
how our vocabularies, scientific or not, develop and evolve 
Changing the way we talk does in one sense change the world, but in a very limited way. 
The last point is because ontologically speaking we have to say with Quine: “A curious thing 
about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon 
monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word – ‘Everything’ – and 
everyone will accept this answer as true” 33 In other words, the world is as it is. Theories come 
and go and they shape the way we perceive the world and what kind of patterns and 
categorizations we pay heed to, but by and large the world remains the same. What might 
change is what is counted as “natural”, what kind of patterns we find to be salient. It is 
important to stress that those patterns are not something we invent, they are already there, but 
new ways of talking about them might change how we view them and which ones we rely on to 
conceive of our practical options, our actions (thus vocabularies will effect the world, in so far 
as we act on it differently).   
 
Reduction and Ontology 
The pragmatic approach endorsed in this paper is intended to support naturalism without 
conceptual reduction. This type of post-Quinean interpretivist strategy claims to mark out a 
fourth possibility in addition to traditional reductionism, elimination and dualism. The main 
idea is that mental processes can (and ultimately will) be naturalized; i.e. the apparent 
metaphysical gap some see between the vocabulary that describes us as intentional beings, with 
beliefs and desires, on one side, and the physical vocabulary that is intended to capture the 
causal regularities of the physical world, on the other, will in one way or another be accounted 
for. The challenge here is to meet the demands of naturalism – i.e. the notion that mental 
phenomena can be explained as part of the natural order and are empirically accessible features 
of the world – and still be able to show that we can keep both the mental and the physical 
descriptions without resorting to dualism.  This is to be done without opting for the 
eliminativist or the reductionist strategy. The naturalistic pragmatist does not see the gap 
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between the mental and the physical vocabulary as one that is ontological in kind. 
Consequently, there is not much gained from conceptual reduction, since the motivating force 
of reductionism is to simplify the ontological catalogue of the world.34    
Since the idea of an ontological gap is left behind, the pragmatist treats the gap between 
the mental and the physical as a malfunction in our philosophical approach to the problem in 
question. By revision of the conceptual structures we rely on to maintain the impression of a 
metaphysical gap the pragmatist suggests that the gap will close itself. We are not free to revise 
the concepts away according to our own inclinations; we are at least constrained by interaction 
with the world. In the following chapters I will take a closer look at what revision consists of. 
The common way to think of the relation between folk psychological and scientific 
vocabularies is to assume that on some level of analysis there is an ontological fact that needs 
to be resolved, and that this fact will be determined by the success or failure of the reductive or 
eliminative proposals. This ontological fact is supposed to validate, or invalidate, the use of 
folk psychological terms for scientific usage. However, as Ramberg35 points out, this argument 
is reversed relative to the pragmatist’s interests. The philosophical legitimacy reduction is 
thought to provide has little to do with the naturalization of the vocabulary of intentionality. 
The reason for this is that the success of the folk psychological categories is irrelevant to the 
ontological consideration at the heart of the arguments for reduction. It is possible to think 
methodologically regarding the different levels of explanation without burdening them with 
ontological preferences. And, as remarked earlier, the reductive proposal is intended to capture 
the causal mechanism of the macro theory as a function of the micro theory, but it is impossible 
to single out an ideal level where causality can be observed directly.  
Folk-ontological convictions burden the traditional idea of physicalism with a 
dichotomous vocabulary to the extent that naturalized pragmatism has trouble spelling out its 
anti-dualistic commitments in relation to it. Most of the debate on the mind-body problem in 
contemporary philosophy has centered on the idea that there is a question to be settled and that 
the weight ultimately will fall down on one of two sides; either there is something ontological 
distinct about the mind, thus confirming some sort of dualism, or there really is only on 
ontological kind, the physical. To point to the mind-body problem as a puzzle that will 
eventually evaporate if we rid ourselves of our ontological intuitions might not be very 
reassuring for the eliminativist, the reductionist, or the dualist. Both the eliminativist and the 
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reductionist might claim that the naturalistic pragmatist in this way is trying to eat his cake and 
have it too (the dualist will probably insist that there are actually two cakes). 
The naturalistic pragmatic approach, in contrast, adopts Davidson’s anomal monism36, 
which Ramberg describes as a Bland Monism. “It is monistic, because it denies the dualist’s 
thought that there are two ontological kinds; mental and physical. It is bland in a somewhat 
peculiar sense; it also denies the reductivist or eliminativist thought that there is one ontological 
kind of a sort to which our various ways of talking may stand in questionable relationship.”37  
This naturalized conception of the mind will not imply that all mental terms will be 
reduced to neurobiology. Following Davidson it might be reasonably claimed that there is no 
way to make that sort of reduction. 38  Irreducibility in this context does not constitute a 
metaphysical gap, or some deep ontological fact, but reflects the divergent human interests that 
vocabularies serve.  
That means that the pragmatist view I am sketching disagrees with Searle when he 
claims that: “the argument for the irreducibility of consciousness is not epistemic; it is about 
how things are in the world. It is about ontology. There are different ways of spelling it out, but 
the fundamental point of each is the same: the sheer qualitative feel of pain is very different 
feature of the brain from the pattern of neuron firings that cause the pain.”39 We can agree with 
Searle that there is a “qualitative feel of pain”, but whether this adds anything to the ontological 
catalog is the important question. The view I am endorsing claims that the differences between 
the qualitative feel of pain and the neuronal underpinnings of it are epistemological and not 
ontological.    
In the chapters that follow I will explore ways of interpreting the difference between a 
description of a mental state couched in neuroscientific terms and a description of the same 
state in a folk psychological (or intentional) terms that does not assume that there is a 
ontological point to be settled, but still is sensitive to the idea that “the neuron firings cause the 
feeling, but they are not the same thing as the feeling.”40 
The idea is to keep a distinction between descriptions of the mental and descriptions of 
the neuronal underpinnings of these mental phenomena, without resorting to dualism. To be 
able to do this – both naturalize and keep a mental-physical distinction – it has to be shown how 
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different vocabularies explain different interest and how those interests are related, and why 
that precludes reduction of the intentional vocabulary.   
In the next chapter I will turn to Paul and Patricia Churchland’s idea of eliminative 
materialism. They argue that the intentional vocabulary should be eliminated in favor of the 




4. The Intentional Vocabulary and Folk Psychology: the 
Churchlands and Eliminative Materialism 
 
 
All the key words in this explanation, by the way, are totally 
misleading due to the everyday quirks of language. 
- Don DeLillo, Ratner’s Star  
 
 
There are many similarities between what I have called the intentional vocabulary and what 
Paul and Patricia Churchland41  refer to as Folk Psychology; both seem to be in the same 
business and they go about it in the same way: explaining and predicting human behavior. I 
shall in this section assume that the intentional vocabulary is roughly the same as Folk 
Psychology (hereafter FP), the rough and ready framework that, according to the Churchlands, 
“denotes the prescientific, commonsense conceptual framework that all normally socialized 
humans deploy in order to comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate the behavior of 
humans and the higher animals. This framework includes concepts such as belief, desire, pain, 
pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear, suspicion, memory, recognition, anger, sympathy, intention, and 
so forth. It embodies our baseline understanding of the cognitive, affective, and purposive 
nature of people”,42 that is, the “rough-hewn set of concepts, generalizations, and rules of 
thumb we all standardly use in explaining and predicting human behavior.”43 In a word, it is our 
most important tool when it comes to guiding ourselves in social situations, and when trying to 
make sense of other people’s behavior. This framework, they argue, is so widely misguided that 
it should be displaced by a better theory.   
 There is a resemblance between the Churchlands’ desire to reformulate FP, in light of 
the fact that human knowledge is speculative and provisional and the questions Rorty raised 
against traditional epistemology in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. But the Churchlands 
arrive at a different conclusion than what I depicted in the last chapter. They do not view the 
mind-body situation as one that is due to different descriptions of the same object; rather they 
see the folk psychological terms as explanatorily impotent and argue that they should be 
removed form a scientific account of the mental. 
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Now, the idea that human knowledge is speculative and provisional is something that is 
widespread in philosophy, but as P.M. Churchland points out, it is “sorely tested when the 
question at issue is the possible displacement of our familiar self-conception – a conception that 
portrays each human as a self-conscious rational economy of propositional attitudes.”44 There is 
little room for revision in light of current neurological development in the Folk Psychological 
framework.  
The eliminative materialist, as exemplified by the Churchlands, is someone who both is 
able to see that all human knowledge is speculative and provisional, and is open to a 
reformulation of the story we tell about ourselves and our place in the world. This means, in 
effect, that the eliminativist shares the view on conceptual frameworks with the pragmatist; 
frameworks are vulnerable to revision and overthrow. Even the conceptual scheme embodying 
the notion of rationality and the related conception of ourselves as folk-psychological agents, 
may be subject to such revision. 
 The Churchlands have been attacking FP for a long time and claim that its current 
epistemic situation resembles more and more the earlier situation of phlogiston, caloric theory, 
alchemy, etc. That is, although FP is seemingly capable of explaining some of the features in its 
domain it is widely misguided and in reality explanatorily impotent: “our commonsense 
conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so 
fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually 
be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience”.45 There are at least 
two symptoms that according to the Churchlands show the failure of FP. First, FP seems to 
have too great a failure rate when it comes to explaining, predicting and manipulating humans. 
Secondly, it has proven difficult to find even a rough disjunctive reduction from FP to current 
neuroscience.  
In order to see why this leads to the elimination of FP I will now take a closer look at 
what has been the Churchlands’ main concerns for the past twenty or thirty years, and why they 
seem to make such a disturbance with their eliminative materialism. What is it they want to see 
eliminated, why, and what, if any, are the consequences of elimination?  
 
Eliminative Materialism 
According to P.S. Churchland an eliminativist is someone who holds: 
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1. that folk psychology is a theory; 
2. that it is a theory whose inadequacies entail that it must eventually be substantially 
revised or replaced outright (hence “eliminative”); and 
3. that what will ultimately replace folk psychology will be the conceptual framework of a 
matured neuroscience (hence “materialism”). 46  
 
The motivating factor for the Churchlands’ thesis of eliminativism is that they see the 
importance of making FP stand up to empirical obligations. Folk Psychology, for the 
Churchlands, is a theory – “a systematic, corrigible, speculative theory”47 – and as such must be 
able to answer to the empirical pressure imposed on it, but it fails to meet up with the criteria 
that an empirical theory should meet. It is both inaccurate and fails to explain some of the key 
issues one would want a theory on the intentional to elucidate, namely mental illness, sleep, 
creativity, memory, intelligence differences, what understanding amounts to, and the many 
forms of learning, to mention but a few. If FP is an empirical theory one would like it to be able 
to explain these. Therefore, the Churchlands have argued that there is a need to reformulate 
what it is to learn, understand, etc. 
This means that Folk Psychology, the commonsensical framework of ordinary mental 
vocabulary and the common-sense understanding of the mental, will be replaced by the 
concepts and commitments of a mature neuroscience, at least whenever we talk seriously and 
literally about what we call the mind. There will be no need for the constructs of Folk 
Psychology once the neurosciences have reached the goal of making sense of the brain and how 
it functions. The Churchlands lend support to this claim by using historical analogies. By 
equating the posits of Folk Psychology with phlogiston, ether, witchcraft, and alchemy they try 
to show that we often use concepts that are useless, and explanatorily impotent, and will 
ultimately vanish from scientific discourse once science has caught up with what is happening 
in the world. In this sense the terms of Folk Psychology do not correspond to any items that 
will be part of a theory of the mental. 
This gives the Churchlands reason to claim that FP is widely erroneous and 
explanatorily impotent. They maintain that FP is a theory and that its success should be 
measured by the way it stands up in comparison to other scientific theories. The intentional 
idioms, they claim, are isolated and the history of FP is stagnant. It is important for them to 
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insist that FP is a theory, because then they can pitch it against other scientific and often flawed 
theories, e.g. the theory of phlogiston, the theory of caloric fluids, and the theory of alchemy. If, 
on the other hand, they are wrong, i.e. that FP does not have a theory like nature, or if it can be 
show that the commitments of FP differ radically from those of scientific vocabularies, it would 
seem possible to defend FP against the attacks.  
  
Dire Consequences  
It is important to point out that the debate over the elimination of FP is not a question of the 
details of the everyday theory, but rather the complete framework. Whether or not a part of the 
theory can be salvaged is not up for discussion. What is at stake is the framework taken as a 
whole. Since some, amongst them Fodor, think that it is more than just the success or failure of 
a scientific program which is threatened, the stakes seem very high. After stating that there is 
nothing that could convince us that FP is wrong Fodor goes on to say: “Which is just as well, 
because if commonsense intentional psychology really were to collapse, that would be, beyond 
comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species; if we’re that 
wrong about the mind, then that’s the wrongest we’ve ever been about anything”48 But he is not 
alone in thinking that the elimination of our everyday understanding of the mental would have 
dire consequences. 
Baker (1987) illustrates how much some take to be in jeopardy when it comes to the 
question of the legitimacy of our common-sense conception of the mental. She thinks that 
practical reasoning, language, morality, rationality, truth, “indeed, cognitive virtue in general”49 
is thrown out the window if the eliminativist is right. And she provides a list of what she takes 
to be the consequences of the eliminative proposal:50 
 
1. Consequences for practical reasoning: 
a) We will lose the ability to make predictions of other peoples behavior. 
b) Ordinary interaction among people would seem mysterious 
c) Behavior could never go wrong; no one could ever do anything unintentionally 
2. Consequences for moral and legal practice: 
d) Explanations of behavior would be wrong 
e) There would be no distinction between lying and honest mistake 
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f) Moral judgments would be false or senseless 
g) Nothing would ever matter to anyone 
3. Consequences for linguistic practice: 
h) Why we say the things we do would be mysterious 
i) Uttering of truths would be miraculous 
j) Reports of deliberation and decision would be false 
k) What ones does would be totally unrelated to what one reports that she thinks 
she is doing 
4. Consequences for Psychology: 
l) Applied psychology would be bogus 
m) Psychological explanations would evaporate 
 
If Baker is correct then it is obvious that much hinges on whether eliminativism is true or not. 
However, I think that it is possible to give eliminativism an interpretation that does not imply 
all the points on the list. In fact, this interpretation does not mean that the skeptic will have to 
be “prepared to swallow all these consequences”51 I maintain that the consequences presented 
by Bakes do not follow from a pragmatic reading of the Churchlands. 
 
Objecting against Eliminative Materialism  
The Churchlands see two kinds of objections made against their idea of eliminative 
materialism. One type of attack is made by those who accept the fact that human knowledge is 
speculative and provisional, but who, for some reason, contests the idea that this also applies to 
our familiar self-conception. Examples of such might be Neo-Platonists (or indeed Kantians) 
who argue for the inevitability of the framework features of FP, or Cartesians who holds that 
the epistemological capacity of introspection is one that is essentially incorrigible, and since 
these are the essential part of Folk Psychology no revision of the vocabulary will be needed (it 
might indeed be impossible). These are objections that contest the idea that humans are 
tentative in their epistemological speculations. This is a battle to be fought at a meta-
philosophical level and does not directly affect the Churchlands’ argument for the elimination 
of the propositional attitudes and folk psychological account of human cognition, as it must be 
settled prior to the arguments the Churchlands draw on. Another kind of objection is made by 
those who accept our cognitive shortcomings, and the theoretical nature of Folk Psychology, 
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while still denying the epistemological evaluation of the framework of Folk Psychology that 
naturally goes with it. These are objections raised within the framework of revisionary 
epistemology. They directly engage the arguments brought by the Churchlands, since they are 
playing on the same field, so to speak. The Churchlands call objections raised against 
elimination within this framework for “inauthentic”. These are called inauthentic since they are, 
on P.M. Churchlands view, unfaithful to the contemporary epistemological perspective, that all 
human knowledge is speculative and subject for revision, even our knowledge about our 
familiar self-conception. Those who hold the “inauthentic” objections claim that conceptual 
frameworks are subject of revision, but not the commonsensical framework of FP. Churchland 
himself devotes considerably more time to these last, “inauthentic”, objections than to the 
objections raised at a meta-philosophical level. What do those objections amount to? 
In the essay “Evaluating Our Self-Conception”52, P. M. Churchland identifies five such 
“inauthentic” objections. In the next few pages I will go through these objections and try to see 
if it is possible to discern a pattern, both in the objections and in the way Churchland responds 
to the objections. The hope is that if a pattern can be distinguished, by taking a step back and 
doing some metaphilosophical reflection it will be possible to articulate the underlying issue at 
stake.  
The first objection is based on the notion that eliminative materialism relies on the 
framework of FP to refute FP; the second objection does not see what could possibly count as 
evidence showing that FP is radically wrong; the third objection maintains that FP is used for a 
vast range of different non-scientific purposes and should not be evaluated as a scientific theory; 
the fourth objection is based on the idea that there are no existing alternatives. The final 
objection is based on the claim that FP consists of functional, or artificial, kinds (kinds created 
by human choice, defined, at least in part, in terms of a function that bears on a human purpose 
like ‘chair’, cycle’ and ‘bungalow’), not natural kinds (kinds that usually figure in scientific 
theories that are intended to capture some underlying essence or sameness, examples are H20, 
gold and the like). This, allegedly, makes it “invulnerable” to empirical revolutions in 
neuroscience (like our conception of say iron fences does not change radically by empirical 
revolutions in metallurgy: what makes a fence largely remains unchanged. How to make fences, 
on the other hand, might change).  
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1. The first objection: Eliminative materialism is a non-starter 
The first objection rests on purely a priori convictions and does not involve any empirical 
considerations. Eliminative materialism must, the argument goes, suppose the concepts it will 
eliminate. To put it crudely, the objection seems to rest on the idea that to eliminate FP 
someone must believe in the elimination of the concepts therein, but since ‘believe’ is a central 
concept of FP it cannot be eliminated (like someone saying “I believe there are no beliefs”).   
 This kind of objection rests on the fact that the logical conclusion from Q to not-Q is 
illegitimate. But this does not discourage the eliminative materialist (or the pragmatist, for that 
matter). She does not see that there should be anything blocking the displacement of Q based 
on Q coupled with further empirical evidence, and the eliminativist does insist on the empirical 
nature of FP (or Q in this instance). The argument runs thus: assume Q, argue from Q and some 
empirical evidence to not-Q and then, by reductio ad absurdum, conclude that not-Q.53  
The non-starter objection must presuppose what it is trying to prove: that beliefs and 
other similar intentional states exist. Specifically, it relies on the idea that beliefs exist in the 
form that they take in traditional propositional attitudes philosophy. But this simply begs the 
question. The Churchlands are trying to provide an alternative to the old structure of Folk 
Psychology, and to assume that they have to do use the old framework when they construct the 
alternative is just foolish. P.S. Churchland (1986) notes that:  
 
What the eliminativist is fumbling to say is that folk psychology is seriously inadequate as a 
theory. Now within the confines of that very theoretical framework we are bound to describe the 
eliminativist as believing there are no beliefs; however, this is not because folk psychology is 
bound to be true, but only because we are confined within the framework the eliminativist 
wishes to criticize and no alternative framework is available. If the eliminativist is correct in his 
criticisms, and if the old framework is revised and replaced, then by using the new vocabulary 
the eliminativist’s criticisms could be restated with greater sophistication and with no danger of 
pragmatic contradiction. […] It would be foolish to suppose folk psychology must be true 
because at this stage of science to criticize it implies using it. All this shows is that folk 
psychology is the only theory available now.  (pp. 397-398)  
 
She then proceeds by showing that a similar non-starter-argument could be made in defense of 
vitalism; the anti-vitalist claims that there is no such thing as vital spirit, but the claim is self-
refuting. If it were to be true the person making the claim would have no vital spirit, 
consequently she would be dead and unable to make the claim. 
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Baker’s list, mentioned above, is also based on the notion that eliminativism entails that 
there is no such thing as a contentful intentional state. From this she concludes that, according 
to the eliminativist, “all attributions of believes, desires, hopes wishes, fantasies, intentions, and 
so on are false.”54  She goes on to say: “if mental states lack content, one cannot assume 
anything; one cannot even suppose that one can.”55 However, by using the reasoning provided 
above it is possible to respond to Bakers criticism.  
For instance, in the corollary of 1a) she says:  
 
Suppose that I dialed your phone number and said, ‘Would you join us for dinner at our 
house on Saturday at 7:00?” You replied, “Yes.” On Saturday, I act in the way I should 
act if I believed that you were coming to dinner. But if neither of us had any beliefs, 
intentions, or other states attributed via ‘that’-clauses, it would be amazing if I actually 
prepared dinner for you and if you actually showed up.56  
 
Compare this with the following defense of vitalism: 
 
Suppose that I dialed your phone number and said, ‘Would you join us for dinner at our 
house on Saturday at 7:00?” You replied, “Yes.” On Saturday, I act in the way I should 
act if I you were coming to dinner. But if neither of us were alive since there is no such 
thing as vital spirit, it would be amazing if I actually prepared dinner for you and if you 
actually showed up. 
 
This last “defense” of vitalism just sounds silly, of course. The defender of the intentional states 
would say that the analogy misses the point. It is, she probably would claim, the content of the 
intentional states which is at stake. And as long as the eliminativist fails to give an explanation 
of what goes on in the first example, without resort to intentional terms, “his profession of 
skepticism about the common-sense conception is just idle play.”57 The vitalist would similarly 
say to his skeptic that as long as no one can give an adequate explanation of ‘being alive’ in 
non-vital-spirit terms, his work is idle play. We know, by now, that a better alternative to 
vitalism was provided by molecular biology and metabolic chemistry. In the same way the 
eliminativist thinks that a sufficient, non-intentional 58  explanation will be provided by a 
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matured neuroscience. Some cannot imagine what an alternative account of mental content 
might look like. This is partly why the eliminativist has trouble getting her message across. She 
might not have the complete answer ready at the present, but she has high hopes for Neural 
Networks, as we will see later.  
 If this objection were correct then it would be possible to argue that there will always 
be something preventing the displacement of a conceptual framework of cognition since “the 
same awkwardness – formulating a rejection of a framework within the framework itself – will 
arise whatever conception of cognition one happens to be using.”59 In fact, it is possible to 
generalize this objection and say that the same argument will block any radical overthrow of a 
framework that enjoys the irrelevant privilege of being the one currently in use.  
 
2. The second objection: What could possibly falsify Folk Psychology? 
The second objection questions what could count as evidence against the success of FP. 
Traditionally there are four prototypical kinds of pressures that count against the success of a 
theory, and the Churchlands claim all four already are exerting pressure on FP: first, there is the 
case of chronic poor performance (a historical example would be Ptolemaic astronomy). Folk 
Psychology is not a perfect theory, although it does well on average its success rate is far from 
100 percent. Actually the Churchlands claim that the success rate is much closer to zero percent. 
FP’s success seems to rely on the fact that the subject it is applied to is a normal, language-
using, adult human. It has proven to be extremely inefficient on infants and those with serious 
mental illnesses. If this is true it places serious pressure on FP should a better theory surface. 
Which leads us to the second kind: pressure is also applied from closely neighboring, well-
performing theories with which the original theory does not seem compatible (a historical 
example would be vitalism in relation to metabolic chemistry and molecular biology). 
Computational neuroscience, and neural networks, provide new kinds of understanding of how 
the brain (or the mind) works; vector-to-vector transformation over neuronal representation 
does not seem to go well with the propositional attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desire, traditionally 
taken to be the central concepts of FP.60 Thirdly, there is the case of poor (or no) extension to 
continuous domains. P.M. Churchland notes that FP “shows no sign of being smoothly 
                                                
59
 Churchland and Churchland (1998) p. 30 
60
 There are different ways of interpreting the status of the propositional attitudes. For the realistic physicalist, e.g. 
Fodor (1987, 1990, 1995), Fodor and Lepore (1992), the distributed states captured by vectors seem unable to 
capture the intentionality of mental states. But one can be realistic about propositional attitudes without thinking 
they need to turn out to be names of physical states. The Churchlands argument seems to have most bite against 
the strong realist.  
  
30 
integrable with the emerging synthesis of several physical, chemical, biological, physiological, 
and neurocomputational sciences. Since active coherence with the rest of what we presume to 
know is a central measure of credibility for any theory, FP’s emerging wallflower status bodes 
ill for its status.”61  
The fourth and final kind is refuting empirical evidence designed to discriminate 
between competing alternatives (for instance Eddington’s eclipse expedition). It is hard to see 
how an experiment could be constructed as to discriminate between, say FP and Neural 
Networks at the present time, but it could be done. For instance, in order to confirm the 
hypothesis that human thought is based upon inferences over propositional attitudes, it might be 
possible to build an artifact that operates in that way. The test then is to see if the system thus 
constructed can display any similarities with our cognitive capacity in real time. This would 
then count as evidence towards FP as a correct theory. This is typically what those in the 
classical artificial intelligence community62 have been trying to do for years, but simulating 
cognitive capacities in computers, in this way, has proven exceedingly hard. Thus far the results 
are indecisive, but there are few indications that they will solve the problem in the near future.  
  
3. The third objection: Folk Psychology is used for a wide range of non-scientific 
purposes. Folk Psychology is not a scientific theory. In fact, it is not a theory at 
all. 
 
The third objection is raised by those who claim that the basic function of Folk Psychology is 
not just to explain and predict human behavior, but that it is used in a vast range of non-
scientific purposes, such as to warn, promise, congratulate, etc. It serves, in other words, 
different purposes than scientific theories characteristically do. From this they conclude that FP 
should not be evaluated as a representative scientific theory. Stich notes that “[o]rdinary folk 
certainly don’t take themselves to be invoking a theory when they use intentional terms to 
explain people’s behavior.”63 And he goes on to state that “Still less do they think they are 
using a theory when they report their own beliefs and desires.”64 Typically, this conception 
portrays scientific theories as an abstract construction of propositions far removed from 
practical life. Folk Psychology on the other hand is characteristically constructed to spell out 
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the practical aspects of daily life as well as the mental and cognitive processes underlying those 
practices.  
Of course, this all depends on what a theory is, and whether or not a person has to be 
aware that she is using one before it can be rightfully called a theory. The Churchlands 
maintain that this objection rests on a too narrow and cartoonist conception of what a theory is. 
In the following I will take a brief look at an intuitive account of what a theory is. For the 
purpose of this discussion it does not matter whether it is possible to give a definition of a 
theory, it will suffice to outline some key points that almost everyone can agree on and then see 
if FP can be called a theory according to those key points.  
Theory does play an intimate part of ordinary life. Think of the carpenter and his 
internalized theory of geometry, the jazz musician and music theory, the physician and medical 
theory, to mention but a few. An important idea pointed out, by amongst others Kuhn, is that 
when the scientist learns his trade she typically does not just learn a set of propositions and the 
logical connections between those. Learning a theory consists much less of memorizing a 
doctrine and much more of slowly grasping a host of miscellaneous skills. These skills include 
perception evaluation, construction, categorization etc. It also involves socializing into a social 
community of practices and shared goals. This conception of how theories are constructed 
spells out the connection between skill, practice, and the more naïve concept of theory 
mentioned above. After a while theories get internalized in the sense that they are automatically 
acted upon. This might seem to reduce their status as theories, since they become less visible, 
but, according to the Churchlands, theories they remain. And in this respect Folk Psychology is 
one of the most thoroughly internalized theories humans ever acquire. This then explains how 
“the claim that FP is an empirical theory is entirely consistent with – indeed is explanatory of – 
the intricate practical life enjoyed by its adepts”.65 It is important in this context, to notice that 
practices as well as theories might be modified or replaced.  
 
4. The fourth objection: Could there be an alternative? 
The fourth objection draws on our ability to imagine what a good alternative to FP would be. 
Proponents claim that there is no existing alternative, and that there is no hope for constructing 
a new one in its place. Fodor seems to hold such a view: “commonsense belief/ desire 
psychology [roughly what I have been referring to as Folk Psychology] explains vastly more of 
the facts about behavior that any of the alternative theories available. It could hardly fail to do 
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so: there are no alternative theories available.”66 He to wants to see a scientific account of 
human psychology, but it should be constructed around the commonsensical framework of Folk 
Psychology. His faith in commonsense intentional psychology rests on the fact that it has been 
with us for as long as we have been thinking creatures, and that it thus far has proved, on his 
view, very successful. There are no compelling reasons to “doubt that very many commonsense 
belief/ desire explanations are – literally – true.”67 And if they turn out to be true they are, on 
his account, a necessary part of the ontological catalogue of the world. It is not only that FP is 
the sole good vocabulary around, but it is the only one that we can imagine ever will be able to 
accurately articulate the different aspects of human behavior and mental life.  
However, we should not be discouraged by our limited imagination. According to the 
Churchlands, it is possible to construct new and radically different theories that will be able to 
explain and predict both human behavior and mental life better than the current 
commonsensical framework of FP. But such a revised explanatory framework might be 
radically different from the existing one. The Churchlands think there are good alternatives to 
FP currently being investigated in computational neuroscience. One of the alternatives 
investigated that seems to be a particularly good substitute is Neural Networks. It differs quite 
radically from traditional Folk Psychology.  
 
5. The fifth objection: Folk Psychology consists of functional kinds 
The final objection takes as its point of departure the notion that FP is not constructed as a 
taxonomy of natural kinds, but rather of functional kinds. Since the ontological integrity of 
functional kinds does not depend on the possibility of being able to find a smooth theoretic 
reduction to a more basic science, usually understood as natural science, a failure to match the 
posits of FP with neuroscience does not threaten the ontological integrity of FP. The 
Churchlands’ main worry with this objection is not that FP is too much like ‘chair’ or 
‘bungalow’, but rather that it is too much like ‘phlogiston’ and ‘caloric fluid’. That is, they are 
worried that FP is a false representation of the dynamic and systematic operations within us. In 
addition, the central terms of scientific theories have traditionally been taken to be natural kinds. 
If the sorts of kinds that are involved in commonsense intentional psychology are functional 
rather natural then there would be little hope that it will be the main part of a scientific theory 
of the mind.  
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Functionalists typically believe that any given mental state can be realized in a wide 
variety of physical types68 (known as multiple realizability), the important thing is not the 
medium but the function of the mental state. As a consequence they argue that a detailed 
understanding of one physical system will not shed light on the fundamental nature of mind. 
Thus, the biological nature of the brain – neurons and neurotransmitters – will not play an 
important or necessary part in a complete theory of the mental. What makes something a 
psychological state is its role in an economy of other psychological states, not its intrinsic 
material properties. Laws characterizing brain processes are independent of laws in psychology. 
If the defenders of FP claim that it is manly constructed on functional kinds, then 
whether or not it is possible to find a rough reduction is not even a question that will ever arise. 
The Churchlands maintain that the most important factor about FP is that it is an empirical 
theory and should be treated as such. This is not a necessary condition if you think that it 
consists mostly of functional kinds. It still plays a role in the explanation, of course, but that 
role is greatly reduced compared to the status its defenders believe it should have. By focusing 
on the empirical nature of FP the Churchlands want us to take FP seriously, in the context of a 
larger account of nature and the place of humans in it. Focusing on functional kinds – chairs 
and bungalows – on the other hand, deflects attention from the empirical obligation of FP, and 
when the empirical consideration is eradicated then it also seems unnecessary to compare FP 
with competing representations of what cognitive activity amounts to.  The status of the kind-
terms involved in folk theoretical explanations will be the main concern in chapter 5.  
 
Reviewing the Objections 
I promised, before reciting the five objections, that I would look for a pattern in the objections, 
and in the response. What has emerged from the discussion? There are, I think, two key 
elements that run through the objections. The first is the disagreement about the status of the 
intentional vocabulary. Is it a theoretical vocabulary that should meet the requirements of a 
scientific vocabulary? Related to this question is also a question about the function of the 
intentional vocabulary; that is, can we separate the scientific purpose of it from all the other 
purposes is serves? The second element is the worry that if we eliminate FP from the account of 
the mental (scientific or otherwise), then a lot will be left unaccounted for. Specifically the 
notions of mental content and mental representation are something that the objectors feel that 
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the eliminativist is unable to give a satisfying account of. In the next sections I will take a 
closer look at these two elements.   
Is Folk Psychology a Theoretical Vocabulary? 
The Churchlands insist that FP is theoretical and whether it is a successful theory is an 
empirical question. The decisive settlement must flow from experimental research and 
theoretical development. But the objectors cannot agree that FP is a scientific theory; it is, they 
claim, involved in a range of other non-scientific circumstances and should not be evaluated as 
an empirical theory.    
I think it will be instructive to take a closer look at the idea that our understanding of the 
mind is based on theory.69 The idea of the theoretical nature of Folk Psychology can be traced 
back to Quine and Sellars.70 Quine showed that the status of science does not rest on the 
foundation of what is immediately given to us, but is theoretical all the way down. This also 
applies to our everyday conception of Physics (what we could call Folk Physics). Sellars 
attacked what he called the Myth of the Given – the idea that some of our beliefs or claims have 
a privileged epistemic status because the facts that make them true are given to us by 
experience. One class of claims that traditionally has been awarded such privileged status was 
the reports of our perceptual experiences. This privileged status of perceptual experiences (or 
sense data, as it also was called) seemed to confirm that we could not be wrong about our own 
mental states; that we are infallible when it comes to our own thoughts and experiences. If we 
were infallible when it came to our “inner mental-states” and thus that our reports of those 
experiences were incorrigible they would hardly seem to be theoretic in nature. One of the 
characteristics of a theory is that it is fallible, that it is open for change in light of new data. 
Sellars rejects the idea that we are incorrigible when it comes to our own experiences of our 
inner mental states. Consequently, they cannot be ruled non-theoretical on the ground that they 
are known with certainty. 
Others, besides the Churchlands, have recently defended the idea that Folk Psychology 
is a theory, amongst them Gopnik and Wellman71 , without necessarily agreeing with the 
eliminativists. Gopnik and Wellman apply the method of contrast to show that the 
understanding of other minds relies on the ability to form a general theory of other minds. The 
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two views they contrast are the idea that a “child’s early understanding of mind is an implicit 
theory analogous to scientific theories, and changes in that understanding may be understood as 
theory changes”72 with the notion that what really counts is the special importance of the first-
person understanding of the mind, i.e. by drawing on the first-person view “the child need not 
really understand the mind, in the sense of having some set of beliefs about it.”73 The child does 
not need to form any beliefs about the other mind since she can operate on a working model of 
her own mind and “[t]he child’s task is to learn how to apply this model to predict and explain 
others’ mental states and actions.”74 Gopnik and Wellman think that this dispute cannot be 
settled on a priori or conceptual grounds; it is a contest between two empirically testable 
hypotheses about the nature of Folk Psychology. 
 The first thing to notice is that “[t]heoretical constructs are abstract entities postulated, 
or recruited from elsewhere, to provide a separate causal-explanatory level of analysis that 
accounts for evidential phenomena.”75 The abstract constructs are thought to give explanations 
of the empirical phenomena available and they explain the data without merely rewording the 
empirical data. In a sense, the theory is to reach beyond the scope of the empirical data.  
Another important idea is that the theoretical construct work together in coherent systems 
characterized by laws, structures or patterns. The explanatory force of a theory stems form both 
its abstractness and from its coherence.76 Further, the theory should be able to predict new and 
unobserved phenomena and events (that reasonably fall under the domain of the theory). This is 
not to say that all predictions made by the theory should be correct. Since the theory goes 
beyond evidence, and since there is a chance the theory is wrong, some of the predictions might 
be wrong as well. These predictions help produce interpretations of evidence not just 
rewordings and generalizations about it.  
What about Folk Psychology, is it a theory in this sense? Gopnik and Wellman notice 
that “there is a change from one mentalistic psychological theory to another somewhere 
between ages two and a half and around four.”77 During that year and a half, or so, the child 
goes from one way of perceiving how other minds operate to another. In the first stage children 
do not rely on inferring the beliefs and desires of other agents and they seem unable to 
distinguish between different states the other agents might be in. They seem to perceive desires 
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and perceptions as fairly simply causal links between the agent and the world (without any 
mental representation). At the age of four (or five) the child is able to distinguish between 
different types of mental states and their different relations to the world of objects. When the 
child acquires this new understanding of minds, (others and her own) she ads to her repertoire 
means to make additional predictions, explanations and interpretations  
 This, then, gives us reason to think that the child now has a theoretical understanding of 
the mind, in the sense laid out above, since “the child’s understanding involves general 
constructs about the mind that go beyond the focal evidential phenomena.”78 The child goes 
beyond the empirical evidence at her immediate disposal and constructs a more general account 
of the behavior of other persons (and perhaps animals). This new abstract and generalized 
account "allow[s] children to make predictions about behavior in a wide variety of 
circumstances, including predictions about behavior they have never actually experienced and 
incorrect predictions.”79 
What can be concluded from this discussion, from a pragmatic point of view? The 
pragmatist does not deny that the intentional vocabulary might have a theoretical nature, but 
this does not necessarily, she will claim, lead to the conclusion that it must be eliminated in 
favor of another better suited scientific theory. When FP is used for scientific purposes then it 
must meet the obligation that any empirical theory should meet, but it also serves other 
purposes and in those circumstances it may be inappropriate to impose the requirements of 
scientific explanation on it. However, it would be equally wrong to conclude from the last point 
that FP is irreducible in principle or that it will never be replaced. This reflects the idea 
mentioned in chapter three that all vocabularies serve some sort of interests. And ultimately 
what makes a vocabulary useful or not is whether it is able to satisfy those interests and 
demands we impose on it at the outset.  
 
Mental Content 
The second element that ran through the objections was the worry that the Churchlands’ 
suggested solution to the problem of mental content and representation, Neural Networks, is 
unfit for the task it is proposed to solve. Traditional propositional attitude theory (and belief/ 
desire psychology) assumes that human cognition is “a dance of sentential or propositional 
states, with the basic unit of computation being the inference from several such states to some 
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further sentential states.”80 But, the Churchlands’ argument is that “the sentential attitudes do 
not play a preeminent role in our cognitive economy. At best they have a limited and superficial 
role. There is some sentence-crunching, almost certainly, but it is not constitutive of cognitive 
activity.”81 Another approach has to be made to the mental, one that does not rely on sentence 
crunching.  
In Neural Networks representations are construed as partitions in multi-dimensional 
vector space. Neural Networks have vector-to-vector transformations which are quite different 
from the semantical/logical structure of the posits of Folk Psychology. The basic unit in a 
neural network is the neuron (or a model of it in simulations). These are highly interconnected 
nodes with a layer of synaptic weight between them. Vastly simplified a neural network is a 
parallel machine, in the sense that signals are processed in many pathways at the same time and 
the sentential structure of Folk Psychology is replaced with activation patterns across large 
groups of neurons.  
 Fodor and Lepore (1996)82 cannot see how a neural network can give rise to mental 
content, or in their words “[s]ince Churchland’s attitude towards the intentional/semantic 
generally tends to be eliminativist, it’s unclear just what properties of contentful states his ‘state 
space’ representations are supposed to preserve.”83  
The first thing to notice is that the way a content and mental representation is accounted 
for in Neural Networks is radically different from the traditional approach of propositional 
attitude philosophy. The traditional belief/desire philosophy, which is intended to capture the 
framework of Folk Psychology, is based on the assumption that the brain operates in a 
sentential fashion, and takes states as beliefs, perceptions, desires, and preferences as the basic 
units of human cognition. These states are then typically described in sentences such as “A 
believes that p” and “A desires that q”, where A is a person and p and q are sentences. These 
propositional attitudes are supposed to capture the property of the mind by which it is directed 
at, about, or 'of' objects and events in the world. Since the basic unit of cognition in a neural 
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network is the distributed representation over several thousand neurons, there seems to be no 
room for these propositional attitudes – “the paradigm of intentionality”84 –  in ‘state space 
semantics’, or so at least, the argument of the objectors runs. But the argument misses its target. 
It does so because the objectors fail to see that “they are now looking at something that does not 
fit any of their antecedent doctrinal categories.”85 To demand that the new, revised, theory of 
meaning should account for the propositional attitudes of the old theory within the framework 
of the old theory, is begging the question. In other words, to object against eliminativism on the 
grounds that the proposed alternative to meaning, the ‘state space semantics’ of neural networks, 
fails to capture the intuitive approach of belief/desire psychology falls short since a “neurally 
grounded theory of meaning may require revision of the very intuition that now seem so secure 
[…].”86 The eliminativist claims, on her side, that the traditional propositional attitude approach 
does not fit in with the evidence coming from neuroscience, and that it should be revised 
accordingly. The pragmatist takes the lesson from the eliminativist, but does not agree that the 
solution necessarily is elimination of the intentional idiom. What the pragmatist wants to 
emphasize is that the intentional vocabulary not only serves the scientific needs of neuroscience, 
but also the normative needs of everyday interaction. 
It would seem that in order to justify a strong eliminativist conclusion it has to be shown 
that there is nothing in the scientific psychology that shares the central properties we assign to 
beliefs and desires, at any level of analysis. The Churchlands take FP, as mentioned, to be 
essentially an empirical idiom. As such it fails to meet up with the standards usually imposed 
on any theory that is to be part of an empirical driven explanation. The concepts making up the 
base of an empirical theory are typically natural kinds and it is not all too clear that the terms in 
FP are natural kinds or some other class of kinds. It depends on how we analyze the concepts 
used in the intentional vocabulary, and how we understand the concept of natural and unnatural 
kinds.  
This might mean that eliminative materialists are right in questioning an uncritical use 
of FP; it might be that those very terms are in need of change. But it does not automatically 
follow that the terms of the intentional vocabulary are not suitable in constructing a theory of 
the mental that meets empirical needs. It turns on how we perceive the terms of the intentional 
idiom. Are they functional kinds, human- made and, as such, not suitable to “cut nature at its 
joint”, or are they natural kinds, concepts that point to “real” differences in nature? The 
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pragmatist thinks that there is room to navigate between a scientifically legitimatization of the 
propositional attitudes of Folk Psychology and the outright elimination of the Folk 
Psychological idiom. That is, the pragmatist wants to grant an element of the eliminativist 
argument – the notion that FP probably is not the best vocabulary to capture the scientific needs 
of neuroscience – but she does not think that the eliminative conclusion follows. 87 In order to 
see why, I will now turn to natural kinds and folk theoretical explanations. 
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5. Natural Kinds and Emotions: Paul Griffiths 
 
 
The proper method of philosophy consists in clearly 
conceiving the insoluble problems in all their insolubility and 
then in simply contemplating them, fixedly and tirelessly, 




The worry articulated by the eliminativist is that the way we currently speak about the mental 
does not pick out patterns that are best suited to be a part of a scientific theory. This, in turn, 
means that if we are sincere about constructing theories about the mental we should expect the 
terms of the commonsensical framework of Folk Psychology – and, as we will see, the 
vernacular category of emotion – to change radically, so much in fact that have to be eliminated 
from a serious theory of the mental. That is what eliminativists are trying to tell us and not that 
we are not conscious, that we do not experience emotions, that we do not have beliefs, or 
anything like that. It is not so much that we do not have beliefs as it is a problem with the way 
we try to give an explanation of those beliefs that will fit a scientific account of the mind. But 
what is a good scientific explanation anyway? Is it possible to single out a set of characteristics 
that signals that we are dealing with a primary scientific explanation? And what should be part 
of a scientific theory of the mental?  
 
Conceptual Analysis and Propositional attitudes 
Even though a lot more is known about the brain today than ever before there are still 
deep disagreements about how to approach the connection between the mind and the brain. 
This might be due to methodological disagreements, but also, some think, conceptual 
disagreements. The main problem is that theorists of the mind (i.e. neuroscientist, cognitive 
scientists and philosophers) do not agree on what counts as a correct answer to the question 
“what is the mind?” or “what is consciousness?” This opens for a disagreement not just about 
whether a given theory accommodates the relevant data, but also a disagreement on what a 
current theory might actually be about. A relevant question to ask, but one that has proved 
exceedingly hard to answer, is whether the theory in question actually is a theory of the mental, 
or, to put it another way: Are we truly giving an explanation of the relation between the mind 
and the brain? Or, as the pragmatist would put it: have the interests that made us ask the 
questions in the first place been satisfied? 
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What some philosophers88 suggest is that what is wrong with contemporary cognitive 
research is failure to appreciate that it faces a specifically philosophical problem that needs to 
be settled before cognitive scientists can do their empirical work. Advocates of this approach 
believe that the current mind-body problem can be solved by doing armchair philosophy.89 
They argue that we need conceptual clarity in order to settle the current mind-body problem 
and the approach they favor in order to resolve these problems is to analyze the ordinary 
competent speaker’s use of a concept and the logical structure of the sentences in which the 
concepts occur. The rationale behind this approach is the conviction that if the correct 
description of ordinary speakers’ use of particular concepts can be worked out – their 
application and the logical structure they are part of – then conceptual clarity is achieved and 
this will mean a long step in the direction of resolving the current problems of neuroscience and 
philosophy of mind.  
Conceptual analysis has been the dominant method in the philosophy of mind the past 
thirty or forty years. At the core of this approach is the conviction that a theory of the mental 
can be constructed by analyzing the beliefs and desires (and related propositions) that feature in 
everyday psychological explanations. These beliefs and desires, the propositional attitudes, are 
taken to be the central theoretical entities of the model and they are often assumed to be the 
simplest components of thought. The mainstream propositional attitude theory assumes that our 
everyday understanding of mentalistic terms is sufficient for a theory of the meaning of the 
mental terms. This is presented as if it were a straightforward outcome of the notion that mental 
phenomena are occurrences of mental states that represent states of affairs in the world, and that 
the analysis of these states are sufficient for giving the content of that mental state.  
According to Griffiths a propositional attitude theorist takes it that “Mental states are 
defined by the rules which ordinary speakers use when applying mental state terms.” 90 
Consequently the important part for the propositional attitude theorist will be to sort out and 
explain how the mental terms are used by ordinary speakers. This in turn is intended to fix the 
content of the mentalistic concept. 
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However, it is appropriate to ask if it is possible to make sense of such a claim. It seems 
to put a lot of weight on the theory of concepts in question. How is this theory supposed to 
account for conceptual changes due to scientific progress? Griffiths notes that: “Our best 
definition of water is the formula HOH, but this could not have been established by conceptual 
analysis! Ordinary English speakers in the past did not know that water was HOH, but this is 
still an important part of what ‘water’ means.”91 Similarly, nothing important would be added 
to the scientific theory of the mental by analyzing the current use of the mental vocabulary. The 
conceptual analysis approach does not capture the fluid concept and creative analogy approach 
most scientific processes demonstrate.  
If this line of reasoning is correct the kind of reasoning provided by conceptual analysis 
is erroneous because it can only tell us what our current beliefs within a domain are. The reason 
for this is that it only specifies the current conditions of application for the terms within that 
vocabulary. Given that the pragmatist is right when she claims that the most important changes 
in our theories are achieved not through arguments and analysis, but through changes in the 
vocabulary, conceptual analysis will not help advance the theories of the domain in question. 
Propositional analysis theory seems too rigid to incorporate new empirical findings into a 
rapidly evolving theory. It cannot accommodate the radical changes that often occur in science 
Griffiths,  whose main concern are emotions, observes that: “Propositional attitude 
theorists think conceptual analysis is the only tool they need to investigate emotions because 
they accept, explicitly or implicitly, a Wittgensteinian distinction between the ‘criteria’ which 
logically define mental state and the inessential ‘symptoms’ that can be studied empirically.”92 
This separation between the logical criteria that define mental states and the inessential part of 
them open for empirically study is something the pragmatist fundamentally disagrees with.  
   According to the propositional attitude theorist the analysis of concepts and 
conceptual relationships antecede the empirical investigation. One of the problems with this 
method is that conceptual revision in light of new empirical findings would, given such a 
division of labor between the scientist and philosopher, be, if not impossible, then at least 
something that would be very hard to explain. It would seem that all scientists ever could hope 
for was to be handed a set of neatly organized concepts by the philosophers and then try to 
asses their truth according to the facts they have gathered from the world. The pragmatist, who 
takes her lesson from Quine, denies that there is a principled distinction between conceptual 
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and conceptual and empirical questions. What the pragmatist does, simply put, is to take the 
Quinean insight and add temporal dynamics. 
This is not to say that the pragmatist conflates empirical and conceptual questions into 
one, she does acknowledge the important distinction between the different modes of inquiry; it 
is just that she sees the distinction between conceptual and empirical matters as temporary and 
local. She doubts that it is possible to know in advance and in isolation of the development of a 
theory exactly what kinds of things that are appropriate objects of the domain. That is usually 
something that is sorted out as we go along and the theory in question matures. And when 
doubt has been cast on the sort of objects that should be part of the inquiry, it is obvious that it 
is hard to work out the logical relation between the thus far unknown objects of the domain. 
This has to be done as development proceeds and it is during this process that the local and 
temporary differences between empirical and conceptual claims become apparent.  
It would seem that the pragmatist approach is orthogonal to that of the propositional 
attitude theorist. Whereas the latter tries to free neuroscience and philosophy from its present 
mind-body problem analyzing the logical relations among the psychological terms and 
suggesting the correct application of those terms, the pragmatist insists that we have to be open 
to the idea that our vocabularies are changing and that we at the present time cannot say what is 
the correct use of that vocabulary. Our interest in a given domain might change as well. Since 
there is a close interplay between the vocabularies we use and the interest we have in those 
vocabularies we should expect this to influence the use of a vocabulary.  
The main tool for the pragmatist is re-description and metaphors; by exploring new 
connections between modes of thinking she tries to shake our intuition and make us accept new 
ways of approaching things that already were taken to be literal truths. This makes the 
enterprise of giving a stable and exact description of what mastery of a given concept is very 
difficult. In fact, the pragmatist philosopher doubts that such a description could be made 
available. If it were to be given it would only give a temporary definition of the term.  
 
Natural kinds and Scientific Explanations  
A consequence of this line of reasoning is that we will have to rethink our relation to some of 
the most common philosophical tools. One of the things that should be reconsidered is how we 
perceive the notion of natural kinds. As we have seen, some have been criticizing the 
eliminativist position by claiming that the framework of folk psychological terms, what I have 
been calling the intentional vocabulary, is made up of a taxonomy of functional kinds rather 
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than natural kinds. They proceed by arguing that the intentional terms will never be reduced to 
neuroscience since the ontological status of Folk Psychology does not depend on it being 
possible to make a rough reduction of the relevant terms. It is ironic that this also is the reason 
why eliminativists want to see the elimination of the Folk Psychological framework and it 
might point to a problem with the current conception of how kinds are to be constructed and 
interpreted.   
As mentioned earlier I am endorsing a view that claims to offer ways of thinking about 
the mental and the physical that implies neither reduction nor eliminativism. I think this can be 
given better support if we reconsider the relation between natural and functional kinds. Natural 
kinds tend to be central in scientific descriptions and explanation. Traditionally conceived, 
science has been involved in giving explanations of the causal processes in nature. Natural kind 
terms are central to such a project since they are usually taken to denote categories that allow 
reliable extrapolation from samples of the category to the whole category. An ultimate 
scientific explanation, some held, required that these categories be subject of universal, 
exceptionless “laws of nature”. This, as it turns out, demands too much of even the most robust 
natural kinds. But luckily it is possible to recast this requirement and generalize from the idea 
of “law of nature” to the somewhat weaker idea that statements are to a varying degree lawlike; 
that is, that they do support counterfactuals, but that this support is always to some degree 
conditional.  
There are at least two good reasons to believe that a proper account of natural kinds 
would be useful to science. First, the theory of natural kinds captures an important aspect of 
human concept formation and how concepts are used. It is therefore not only a very good 
scientific tool: since the formation of concepts needs to be informed by what we know it also 
provides a glimpse of the psychology of concepts. Secondly, it can be modeled in such a 
fashion that it allows us to mediate between competing strands of empiricism and realism. That 
is, in Griffith’s words, “If the theory of natural kinds is a central part of the best scientific 
account of concept formation and use, then an ability to make sense of this becomes an 
adequacy condition on any account of how thought and language relate to the world.”93 It is 
only the strong metaphysical realist who would claim that the link is one-directional: the real 
structure of the world dictates which concepts that best fit in a theory describing it. For 
Griffiths there are no theory-independent kinds that will anchor such a theoretical view. 
Categories and kinds are dependent on the theoretical concepts that represent them and theories 
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and concepts change as we interact with the world. Natural kinds can provide an explanatory 
link between the world and the concepts we use to categorize it.  
It is also desirable that an account of natural kinds is in accordance with what we now 
know about cognitive development, and how we form concepts. Experiments show94 that as 
children grow older they tend to regard natural kinds as grouped together by some sort of inner 
essence, distinct from their superficial properties, while kindergarten kids put more weight on 
physical appearance. For the older kids both genealogy and function are more important than 
the overall physical appearance. But in both cases experiments suggest that children in general 
privilege the intended function of objects when it comes to human made artifacts while they 
believed that biological species have some unseen properties that survive even if their 
superficial characteristics have been transformed.  
A study done by Santos, Hauser and Spelke95  concludes that the ability to classify 
objects in a domain-specific manner is something humans, in a large degree, share with other 
non-human primates. They set out to answer the question “How do organisms decide which 
features to attend to in order to build effective strategies for classifying the complicated 
assortment of objects in their world?”96 The study was carried out on two human children and 
two non-human primate species – captive cotton-top tamarins and free-ranging rhesus monkies. 
They used foods and artifacts as the two different domains the subjects were to be confronted 
with. As already mentioned, human children tend to choose artifact according to their 
functionality (e.g. shape, rigidity, and size) over physical appearance. Both the tamarins and the 
rhesus monkeys showed the same behavior. They reliably chose tools according to their 
functionality, rather than physical appearance, when presented with novel tools with varying 
colors and shapes (these tools were typically used for retrieving rewards). The experiment then 
turned to another domain, food, where the features of shape and orientation play little role.  
Children from around the age of three or four start to predict that objects of the same 
color will have the same smell and taste. In a word-labeling test Santos et al. was able to show 
that “children used the feature of color, not shape, when generalizing labels to new food 
objects.”97  In the same manner they were able to show that the monkeys generalize their 
learning about edible objects (watching others eat) according to color, but not shape. This 
means that there is a propensity both in humans and in monkeys to generalize in a domain-
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specific manner.98 This suggests that objects are not clustered on a neutral basis from which 
understanding is achieved, but they are rather clustered on the basis of background theories. 
And this is what we should expect. Different features are likely to be part of different domains 
of inquiry. Sometimes it is relevant to ask of the age and sex of an animal sometimes it is not, it 
all depends on the question you want to be answered. And this should be reflected in a well 
informed theory of natural kinds.  
We should be careful before we draw the conclusion that the propensity to group objects 
in kinds according to domain-specific properties is genetically programmed, though. This is 
might not be a good way of capturing how a trait that has evolved is realized in a new 
generation. It disregards the idea that traits depend on a whole of range developmental resource 
in order to be realized.99  
The traditional view of natural kinds, with exceptionless laws, would seem too rigid to 
allow anything to count as a scientific biological explanation. For instance, how are we to 
account for speciation in light of exceptionless laws? Individuals within species usually differ 
radically in wide range of properties – morphological, physiological, and behavioral, to 
mention a few. Genes and phenotypic characters vary too much within the groups over which 
biologists need to generalize. Since species are one of the prototype examples of natural kinds, 
the theory should be able to accommodate for such local variation within species. Griffiths’ 
idea, therefore, is to rework and soften the notion of natural kinds, in light of the needs posed 
by biology. By abstracting from the specific need of biology we will see a theoretical tool better 
suited to explain the categorization of different concepts involved in scientific explanation.  
 
The Essentialist View 
Speciation in biology is intended to show a deeper sameness or essence in different members of 
the same species and help describe the differences with other species, and “one way to express 
this deeper commonality is to say that members of a kind share an essence – a property 
common to all the members of a kind and responsible for each member being the kind of thing 
that it is.”100 The meta-task for biologist is to find a method that allows for a way to capture and 
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explain this underlying “nature”. The underlying nature is then taken to constitute a natural 
kind.  
But, it has proven very hard to agree on what exactly should count as an essential 
property and how to describe it. What should count as the underlying “nature” of two members 
of the same species, the “nature” that biological explanation is intended to capture? Different 
approaches are possible, but it seems to be agreed upon that “the shared nature of a biological 
kind cannot be either a set of phenotypic characters or a set of genes. Both vary too much 
within the groups, such as species, about which needs to generalize.”101 
 
Paul Griffiths and Natural Kinds 
I will now turn to a view of natural kinds that is sensitive to both evolutional reasoning and the 
revisionist perspective central to the pragmatist’s position. Paul Griffiths has recently given 
such an account of natural kinds.102 His notion of kinds is one that not only “cuts nature up at 
its joints” by analyzing the referents of the terms involved; it is also historical in essence. On 
Griffiths’ liberal view, natural kinds are not the most fundamental categories of nature as was 
the common idea in the early days of natural kind-talk. Instead they are viewed as non-arbitrary 
“ways of classifying the world that correspond to some structure inherent in the subject matter 
being classified”.103  The order of the correspondence here is important to emphasize. For 
Griffiths it is not the case that we have to make our concepts correspond to some real structure 
in the world in order to achieve scientific progress, rather it is “empirically adequate 
background theories which allows us to construct projectable concepts.”104 
Griffiths view does not only rely on the idea that kinds should be natural and useful in 
scientific explanation. What makes his account particularly interesting is that it explicitly states 
that what is taken to be a natural kind is relative to the domain of which it is a part. In Griffiths’ 
own words: “The use of different concepts promotes different agendas.”105 This makes it very 
interesting in the context of the pragmatic stance I have been sketching, with different 
vocabularies as promoters of different interests. Although his approach was mainly constructed 
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to accommodate emotions and their role both in psychological and neurological theories, and 
the need for biological explanations generally, I think there is a lot we can learn by 
extrapolating his idea of kinds and see whether it is applicable to the mental domain in general. 
Another reason that makes Griffiths approach interesting in our context is that he 
regards himself as an eliminativist. 106  This is a conviction he has in common with the 
Churchlands, although the subject of elimination differs somewhat. While the Churchlands 
argue that the folk psychological framework is up for revision and elimination, Griffith attacks 
what he calls the vernacular categories of emotion. This way of referring to emotions shows 
that it has some common features with Folk Psychology: both are taken to be commonsensical 
frameworks and to be what people (lay persons) refer to as emotions or mental phenomena. 
When the Churchlands claim that FP is widely erroneous and will be eliminated in favor of a 
matured neuroscience they base this on the fact that it fails as an empirical theory. Griffiths 
claims, on the other hand, that the vernacular category of emotion is not suited to the scientific 
theory of emotion since the concept does not form a natural kind. This is also an empirical 
matter, but it would seem that Griffith’s position is stronger, in the sense that he does not have 
to rely, as the Churchlands do, on historical analogies. At the same time Griffith is less 
categorical when it comes to the elimination of the framework. He is not opposed to the idea 
that the commonsensical framework serves other, non-scientific, purposes. It is the scientific 
use of the vernacular category of emotion he attacks, and in this sense it is up for elimination. It 
would at this stage be instructive to see why Griffiths opts for the elimination of emotion and 
then compare it with the Churchlands’ idea of elimination with respect to the vernacular mental 
categories. I think it is possible to point at some instructive similarities and differences. Let us 
start by taking a closer look at Griffiths’ argument for the elimination of the vernacular concept 
of emotion. 
 
Natural Kinds in Biology 
Griffiths’ account of natural kinds is by and large based on examples from biology. 
According to Griffiths, biology is facing the following problem: if taxa are genealogically or 
historically defined, they cannot be natural kinds. Natural kinds are traditionally thought of as 
subject of universal laws (spatiotemporal unrestricted laws of nature), they must have universal 
applicability and cannot be historically or genealogically defined. If natural kinds are thought of 
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in this way the status of biology as a science is threatened, since the constructions of biological 
laws are contingent on history and thus not candidates for universal laws (in fact, with regard to 
evolutionary explanation, it is not clear that we are dealing with explanation by way of law at 
all). Without laws enabling biologist to make reliable predictions and to extrapolate from 
observed to unobserved instances, biology is reduced to the study of how things happen to be 
here and now. Biologists should be able to extrapolate from observed to unobserved instances, 
that is, the kinds used in biology should be projectable.  
 In evolutionary biology the notion of natural kinds is intended to group certain species 
based on clusters of similar properties and give us reliable categories.107 But there is a problem 
with the notion of similarity. There are numerous properties an object can have and there are 
indefinitely many ways of grouping them together. This has posed a problem for the taxonomist 
who hoped to group together different animals on the account of their overall similarity. But 
since there is no such thing as overall similarity, only similarity relative to a set of properties, 
finding algorithms that choose the suitable similarities is basic to the scientific explanation of 
the taxonomy of species.  
There are two fundamental sets of categories brought about by evolution: The first types 
are homologies: this is when the same structure is providing the same function in different 
animals. A homologue structure is similar among related organisms because those organisms 
have all descended from a common ancestor that had an equivalent trait. According to Darwin, 
bats and whales possess similar bone structures because they inherited them from a common 
ancestor, not because they were constructed according to the same archetype. The second types 
are analogies; two unrelated structures are selected by natural selection for the same ecological 
and functional role. A good example would be wings in bats and birds. The wings of bats and 
pigeons are functionally alike, but genealogically different. Since speciation is intimately linked 
to genealogy biologists cannot rely on functionality to show what kinds of species are closely 
related.  
 Categorizations made by analogies do not have the explanatory power to help form 
natural kinds since “similarities due to analogy (shared adaptive function) are ‘shallow’”.108 
This shallowness assures that the deeper you dig the more dissimilarities are likely to become 
apparent, and the more the mechanisms under scrutiny will diverge. Bird wings and bat wings, 
for example, are very different in internal structure, although they have similar aerodynamic 
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properties. Homological relationships (shared ancestry) on the other hand, are “notoriously 
‘deep’: even when the function has been transformed, the deeper you dig the more similarity 
there is in the underlying mechanisms.”109 The homologies are reliable enough to serve as a 
basis of scientific explanation; that is, they form reliable categories with correlated properties.  
This clustering of properties is explained by a mechanism referred to as causal homeostasis: “A 
category brings together a set of objects with correlated properties. The category has causal 
homeostasis if this set of correlations has some underlying explanation that makes it projectable. 
A successful category captures […] a causal homeostatic mechanism – something which means 
that the correlations can be relied on to hold up in unobserved instances.”110  
In evolutionary biology the search for causal homeostatic mechanisms was solved by 
relying on evolution to guide the clustering of properties. Algorithms that in this way 
selectively pick out patterns of phylogenetic relationships and evolutionary history are called 
cladistic. Cladistically determined taxa have an historical essence, as opposed to intrinsic 
essence, since “nothing that does not share the historical origin of the kind can be a member of 
the kind”111 
This way of grouping organisms together gives more explanatory power than relying on, 
say, resemblance in intrinsic properties. By using cladistic algorithms no degree of resemblance 
will put an organism in family with another if they descend from different ancestors. The 
success of this strategy can be explained by the fact that organisms have evolved by natural 
selection, and the cladistic algorithm traces this process. Evolutionary theory helps the 
taxonomists to search for helpful patterns in the biological data, patterns that do not rely on 
superficial resemblance, but on properties that are more useful to biological explanation.  
This approach to natural kinds differs from the traditional essentialist approach in at 
least two ways. First, there is no requirement of an occurrence of a universal and unique 
property occurrence in all the members of a kind. Species can be natural kinds even though the 
members do not share a qualitative essence. Second, Griffiths’ account of natural kinds allows 
for species to evolve without excluding them from the natural kind category. Species can vary 
both over time, and at a time. However, that is not to say that there is no limit to the variability 
allowed in a species. Species must be sufficiently stable so it is possible to make better than 
chance predictions about some of the properties of a species.  
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The homeostatic causal mechanism is present in other sciences as well, apart form 
biology. In chemistry, for example, the underlying mechanism that provides causal homeostasis 
is the microstructure of the molecules.  
Now we can see the emergence of a theory of natural kinds, one that holds up to the 
demand of projectability without placing a too demanding constraint on the clustering 
mechanisms. A kind, on this view, is minimally natural if it possible to make better than chance 
predictions about the properties of its instance. This might seem to be a very loose definition of 
a natural kind, but it is not without force. First, it does not open for an arbitrary classification of 
the nature; some causal process in nature must be present to warrant categorization of objects or 
properties influenced by that process. Second, it assures that the objects being classified are 
being categorized on the basis of the ‘deeper’ similarity they share (whether it is homological 
traits in evolutionary biology or microstructure in chemistry). Third, even though the 
generalizations of the special sciences fail to live up to the ideal of universal exceptionless laws 
of nature they still provide some counterfactual force, a key part of the conception of natural 
kinds. And finally, “the minimal account of naturalness lends itself to successive restriction that 
allow us to distinguish between kinds of greater or lesser naturalness and hence of greater or 
lesser theoretical value.”112  
 
Natural Kinds and the Special Sciences  
Parallel to the idea that natural kinds are supposed to capture the universal laws of nature runs 
the idea that the natural sciences are the basis from which the other sciences ultimately will 
derive their legitimacy. This, of course, is the motivational force behind the reductive proposal. 
Reductionism is taken to be an empirical doctrine and it plays a regulative role in scientific 
practice. For such a program the search for bridge laws connecting the properties of the special 
sciences with the physical sciences becomes imperative.  
The philosophical account of natural kinds is mainly a contribution to the philosophy of 
science; it is intended to show how the natural scientist can make predictions and inductions. 
But the model of natural kinds presented by Griffiths is applicable not only to an ideal – or 
ultimate – physical science, but to the special sciences as they stand. Griffiths notes that 
traditionally there has been a difference between the way philosophers use the term natural kind 
and the way social scientists (linguists and psychologists, in particular) use the term. For the 
philosopher it is intended to show a real distinctions in nature (his own examples are chordate 
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and chlorine), while social scientists use ‘natural kind’ to designate categories that all human 
societies use “such as tree or bird”.113 
Since the idea of intrinsic properties, or essence, shared by all the members of the kind 
is abandoned, processes and concepts previously thought to be outside the grasp of natural 
kinds can now be incorporated into it. Socially constructed kinds are among those who might 
be natural kinds on this view. Griffiths uses money as an example. 114   The lawlike 
generalizations of economy do not hold because of the shared microstructure of the monetary 
units. It is the social conventions of the economy that make the generalizations possible, but 
this is enough to guarantee that money does form a natural kind. It is easy to see that the 
requirements of a minimally natural kind are satisfied: it is possible to do better than chance 
predictions about the economy and there are some underlying causal mechanisms that warrant 
the predictions. For instance, a definition of inflation might read: “A persistent increase in the 
level of consumer prices or a persistent decline in the purchasing power of money, caused by an 
increase in available currency and credit beyond the proportion of available goods and 
services.”115 The fluctuation of the economy market can be reliably predicted since there are 
causal factors that regulate it. Economists can predict when prices will fall and when they will 
increase and these predictions will be better than chance, based on the causal, albeit human-
made, mechanisms that underlie it. This is not to say, of course, that they will always be right, 
but the economist can assert that the decrease in the money supply typically leads to a 
tightening of the economy, all things being equal. The economist’s statement carries 
counterfactual force, a key element of a scientific law, and it establishes the fact that the 
monetary fluctuations are regulated by causal mechanisms.  
It is possible to generalize this line of reasoning into insight into the nature of the special 
sciences. The special sciences derive their legitimacy, not from the search of bridge laws that 
will ultimately explain the generalizations made by the special sciences in terms of basic 
physical science, but from the possibility of finding homeostatic causal mechanisms that 
explain the lawlike generalizations of that science. This breaks down the traditional distinction 
between natural kinds and kinds made by humans. The upshot of this way of viewing natural 
kinds is that the “categorizations from any special science that enter into the generalizations of 
that science are now commonly regarded as natural kinds. Inflation and schizophrenia take their 
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place alongside electrons and stars.”116 The bias for basic physical science as the science that 
best captures the way the world really is, is abandoned.  
  
Eliminating Emotion 
How does Griffiths use this conception of natural kinds to argue for the elimination of emotion? 
The main reason Griffiths opts for elimination is that the psychological states and processes that 
fall under the vernacular (or folk theoretical) category of emotion do not allow for a unified 
scientific explanation. They fail to do so because emotion, on his view, does not form a natural 
kind. Ultimately, natural kinds are supposed to be “categories which admit of reliable 
extrapolations from a sample of the category to the whole category”117 In this way the proper 
use of natural kinds is to allow for scientific unity and explanation. 
But emotion terms are more like the “partial reference” terms, like jade (or lily). Jade is 
both jadeite and nephrite and as such cannot be treated as a single kind by geologist. When it 
comes to explaining the occurrence of jade in geological deposits, their geological origins, and 
when predicting the abundance of jade in unknown geological deposits, two different 
explanations must be invoked for the different kinds of jade. This, Griffiths maintains, is also 
true of emotions; different explanations must be invoked in order to explain different 
occurrences of, for instance, anger. What is referred to in the vernacular as anger might differ 
substantially in the biological and neurological realization in different circumstances. One 
instance of anger might be an instantiation of a pure affect program – a short lived highly 
automated response –in one situation.  In another situation it might be a more complex 
cognitive response to more highly analyzed information. Since these, though all being called 
anger in the vernacular, have different neurological and biological realizations they are in need 
of different sorts of explanations. These different aspects of anger are only superficial similar 
and as such is much like the “folk category of lilies [which] is of extremely limited use for 
explanation and induction.  It collects no cluster of properties beyond a certain vague visual 
gestalt.”118 If the sciences of mind are to give scientific explanations of emotion, then they have 
to develop different theories of different emotions and even different theories for what we now 
take to be the same emotion. By analyzing the status of emotion in relation to kind-talk, 
Griffiths wants to see whether the way emotions today are individuated stand up to the needs of 
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a serious science of emotions. To use the terms developed in the previous section: there are no 
underlying homeostatic causal mechanisms in the vernacular category of emotion.  
Griffiths’ suspicion is that any psychobiological theory of emotion would have to rely 
on analogies and as such would not be good scientific theory. Such a theory, although it might 
be a useful ecological generalization, would not be useful for psychological or neuroscientific 
generalizations. Empirical discoveries would probably show that the domain of affective and 
motivational phenomena is large and diverse. The domain does not fall under a natural kind, 
but it would be possible to discern different kinds of emotions (i.e. primary emotions, 
secondary emotions, background emotions, etc) within it. In chemistry, for comparison, the 
basis is provided by atoms and their bonds, “but lumping together mixtures, compounds, alloys, 
pure elements and pure isotopes on the grounds that they are all ‘chemical substance’ is not 
very helpful.”119  
The conceptual analysis theorist may object to Griffiths and claim that he conflates 
questions about natural kinds with questions of whether the concept of emotion has been given 
a univocal analysis. But it is easy to see that these two questions have little to do with each 
other. Superlunary objects, for instance can be given a univocal analysis, something is 
superlunary if and only if it is outside the orbit of the moon. But to say that the objects outside 
the orbit of the moon form a natural kind is highly dubious (once again there is an absence of 
homeostatic causal mechanisms). Especially when we keep in mind that natural kinds, in 
Griffiths’ sense, are basic parts of scientific explanations, and should help form scientific 
theories. The category of superlunary objects ceased to be a candidate for natural kinds with 
Galileo’s astronomical discoveries and has not played a part in any serious scientific theory 
since. Griffiths’ idea is that the same should be the case with emotions; they do not form a 
distinct kind suitable for scientific enquiry. Griffiths conclude that the “question about emotion, 
therefore, is not whether we can give a single ‘account’ of the category in the sense of a 
philosophical analysis of the emotion concepts, but whether the category thus singled out is a 
productive object of scientific enquiry.”120 Thus he stresses the scientific part of the question. In 
the next chapter I will take a closer look at the idea that it might be that the vernacular 
categories of emotion and of the mental survive elimination if we argue that they are mainly 
involved in non-scientific purposes. That is, I will take a closer look at the third objection raised 
against the Churchlands in the previous chapter, but this time the normative aspect of Folk 
Psychology will be the crucial point, not whether it is mainly constructed of functional kinds or 
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not. I start off by comparing the motivation the Churchlands have for the elimination of Folk 
Psychology with the account presented by Griffiths.  
  
56 
6. Griffiths and the Churchlands: Compare and Contrast 
  
 
Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. 
“But which is the stone that supports the bridge?” Kublai 
Kahn asks. 
“The Bridge is not supported by one stone or another,” 
Marco answers, “but by the line of the arch that they form.” 
Kublai Kahn remains silent, reflecting. The he adds: “Why 
do you speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that 
matters to me.” 
Polo answers: “Without the stones there is no arch.”  
 
-Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities 
 
We have just seen two different kinds of eliminative strategies and natural questions that arise 
at this point are: what do they have in common and, in what way do they differ? Does the softer 
pragmatic view on natural kinds lend support to the idea that the intentional vocabulary should 
be eliminated on the grounds that it is unfit for scientific purposes? Or is it the case that it is 
irreducible on the grounds of its mainly normative aspects? Natural kinds are not given to us by 
the world as ahistorical types or objects of lawlike generalizations, but incorporate historical 
and contingent factors. In the field of biology this means that historically defined taxa are 
natural kinds with the corollary that evolutionary homologies are natural kinds as well. What 
happens when this lesson is carried over to the story of our mental lives?  
As a first approximation we might say that what differentiates the eliminativist position 
of the Churchlands with that of Griffiths’ is that the Churchlands compare FP with phlogiston 
and caloric fluids, while Griffiths equates the vernacular category of emotion with superlunary 
objects. The difference lies in the ontological status of the phenomena the commonsensical 
framework is being compared to. As already mentioned, the category of superlunary objects 
refer to something that exists (all objects above the moon), but that particular way of grouping 
objects has no theoretical value, it will not be useful to science. Phlogiston and caloric fluids, 
on the other hand, are no longer believed to exist in any ontologically committing way. This 
means that they are not just unfit for scientific use; there is no way to make the concepts 
intelligible by reference to nature. Accordingly it seems that Griffiths allows that there is such a 
thing as emotion (as it is being referred to in the vernacular), while the Churchlands, by contrast, 
apparently claim that what the framework of FP refers to does not really exist. However, they 
are not dogmatic in their claim. Echoing the question raised by Rorty – quoted earlier, in the 
second chapter – Patricia Churchland notes that: “The treacherous difficulty here is that we 
cannot be sure when we are asking the right question. We do not know whether such categories 
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as ‘emotion’, ‘declarative memory’, ‘procedural memory’, ‘learning’, and ‘consciousness’ pick 
out a unified, single natural kind, or whether these categories herd together quite motley 
collections of disparate phenomena – whether searching for the neural substrate for ‘memory’ 
is like looking for the ‘principle’ that unites jewels, such as amethysts, diamonds, amber, and 
pearls.”121  
The Churchlands argue quite forcefully for the elimination of common-sense 
psychology and although they probably are open for a non-scientific use of FP, in a limited 
sense, they do not seem to be open for the idea that it might radically change in light of the 
discoveries made by neuroscience. Griffiths, on the other hand, has a more relaxed attitude 
towards elimination. He makes the point that common-sense psychology may well develop and 
change its understanding and classification of emotion in light of scientific discoveries. And 
even though they are in different businesses that does not preclude the idea that the common-
sense framework should not and cannot learn from science.  
All this being said, it is worthwhile to notice that the motivation for the elimination of 
the commonsensical framework is something the Churchlands and Griffiths seem to share. 
They both see the need for a vocabulary that better serves scientific needs. The classification of 
objects into superlunary and sublunary objects does not pick out categories that are useful in 
any serious scientific enterprise; in a word, they do not help astronomers in making inductions 
and explanations about heavenly objects.  
Griffiths argues that the vernacular category of emotion groups together properties with 
different biological and neurological realizations. There is no shared homeostatic causal 
mechanism supporting the vernacular category of emotion and as such they are not useful to the 
scientific study of emotion. Correspondingly, in the Churchlands’ case there is little, or no, 
hope of finding neurological correlations to the terms of Folk Psychology (or the terms of 
propositional attitude theory) and therefore FP is not suited to the scientific study of the mental, 
or cognitive activity in general. 
In this sense, categorizations that are not of interest to science do not necessarily 
categorize unreal objects; it is just that the categorization itself does not serve the needs of 
science. This raises, of course, the question of whether it is possible to make a viable distinction 
between scientific vocabularies and other kinds of vocabularies, vocabularies that serve 
different, non-scientific purposes. 
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One such purpose for the intentional vocabulary is to articulate the different normative 
constraints and commitments of everyday interaction amongst humans. At this point it might 
seem that we are only reiterating the third objection raised against Eliminative Materialism in 
chapter 5: Folk Psychology serves a vast range of non-scientific purposes, and therefore it is not 
even a subject of reduction or elimination. The point I want to make, however, is that even if at 
the present there is little or no hope of getting a reductive explanation of the mentalistic terms 
this has little to do with the idea that Folk Psychology is non-theoretic or non-scientific. There 
is, in light of the pragmatic view I have been sketching, no longer possible to operate with a 
distinction between the kinds of vocabularies that get to settle what there really is, and other 
kinds of vocabularies. This means that just because a concept finds no home in a project of 
systematic natural scientific explanation, we should not assume that it does not classify real 
things in a useful way. This is not to deny that there are some vocabularies better suited for 
scientific practices, but that does not make a particular vocabulary better at capturing the “real” 
world. It is just that the vocabulary is more useful to the scientist at the present.  
 
The Normative Aspect of Folk Psychology  
One way to object to the elimination of the vernacular psychological terms is to claim that they 
are primarily normative kinds and whether or not they constitute a natural kind is beside the 
point. Some claim that the irreducibility of Folk Psychology stems from this normative aspect. 
Scientific theories, they claim, are only descriptive and the idea of reducing a largely normative 
theory to a descriptive one would be equivalent to try to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  The 
intentional vocabulary incorporates patterns that single out the normative aspect of the 
interaction between people, in a way that could never be captured by a neuroscientific theory.   
Paul Churchland (1981) identifies an objection made against eliminative materialism by 
those who think that the normative aspect of Folk Psychology guarantees its irreducibility. 
They build their defense of FP on the logical structure of the proposition at the core of FP, that 
is, they typically believe in the propositional attitude theory. The structure of FP is, on this 
theory, intended to be a “characterization of an ideal or at least a praiseworthy mode of internal 
activity.”122 It outlines what it is for someone to have beliefs and desires, and consequently 
what it is to be rational. We might not live up to the ideal rationality laid down by FP, but this 
does not diminish the normative dimension of FP. They conclude that “though neuroscience 
may usefully augment it, FP has no pressing need to be displaced, even as a descriptive theory; 
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nor could it be replaced, qua normative characterization, by any descriptive theory of neural 
mechanism, since rationality is defined over propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires.”123 
We saw in the previous chapter that Griffiths turns down a propositional attitude theory 
approach to emotion on the basis that it fails to add anything important to a scientific account of 
emotion (that is, it can only give a description of the current use of the terms involved).  
Paul Churchland, in his attack on FP, does not entirely dismiss the idea that there is 
something normative about the folk psychological terms, but he thinks this is just a coincidence 
that we “just happen to value”124 the intentional terms. His argument is that the normative 
aspect of Folk Psychology does not warrant its survival in light of recent empirical discoveries.  
He notes that the rationality that FP ascribes to us is not an ideal rationality as some 
suggest. Even if our current conception of rationality is largely constituted within the 
framework of FP, it is not an insurance against the possibility that this framework might be 
inadequate to capture a deeper a more accurate account of cognition, which he sees necessary.  
We have already seen that there is very little a propositional attitude can add to a 
scientific theory, but it may be that it captures the normative aspect of human interaction in a 
way that the scientific account cannot. According to Paul Churchland, “the fact that the 
regularities ascribed by the intentional core of FP are predicated on certain logical relations 
among propositions is not by itself grounds for claiming anything essentially normative about 
FP.”125 He maintains that the logical structure of the regularities predicated by FP is on par with, 
for instance, the classical gas law, and then goes on to say: “A normative dimension enters only 
because we happen to value most of the patterns ascribed by FP.”126 And what is more: those 
evaluations, those normative convictions, are often changed by fresh insight, something the 
propositional attitude theory seems unlikely to capture. The pragmatist acknowledges the fact 
that the normative dimension is contingent, but this does not seem to diminish its practical 
aspect.  
There is another path open for Griffiths which turns on a consequence of the historicist 
approach to kinds that he favors: it is doubtful that it is possible to separate the normative from 
the descriptive use of a concept. Griffiths does not deny that there is a normative aspect of the 
concept of emotion, but this does not relieve concepts of emotion from all pressure put on them 
by empirical discoveries, as it is commonly thought to do. Normative concepts, no less than 
natural kinds, are equally part of an open-ended, since both normative as well as epistemic 
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projects offer motive for changing extension and intension of the concept. Griffiths cannot see 
that there is a way “that description and prescription can be cleanly separated”.127 On his view 
the very same kind (human made or natural) “are used to predict and explain human behavior 
and to prescribe and condemn that behavior.”128  
The naturalistic pragmatist has more sympathy with this idea that there is no principled 
way to separate the normative from the descriptive use of concepts. She also thinks that any full 
account of human behavior has to include both, especially when those terms figure in 
essentially normative practices. One such practice is the ability to interpret another speaker. 
What makes the task of interpretation “practicable at all is the structure the normative character 
of thought, desire, speech, and action imposes on correct attribution of attitudes to others, and 
hence on interpretation of their speech and explanation of their action.”129 
The pragmatic approach I described in chapter three is exactly a stab at explaining the 
link between language, thought and world. The big difference is that thus far I have been trying 
to cash out the relation as one that has to do with our vocabularies and how we use them 
without saying anything very precise about how vocabularies are constructed (or how they 
come to be constructed; it is indeed less a matter of conscious construction than of development 
through use), and how they change over time in light of new empirical discoveries and new 
norms. The pragmatic approach would be greatly enriched, I think, by adopting an account of 
natural kinds that is more versatile than the old conception of natural kinds. Another important 
factor is the notion, advanced by Griffiths, that the different categories are natural only relative 
to the domain in which they are being applied, and that they are connected to this domain by 
background theories. The pragmatist says that what counts as a correct description of a domain 
depends on the vocabulary, which in turn is relative to the interest that guides it in the first 
place. Different normative and theoretical commitments spell out the commitments and 
constraints at the heart of that vocabulary and the normative and descriptive part of the 
vocabularies will interact so that the realization that some of the concepts of FP do not 
constitute a single kind will have impact on its role as a normative kind.  
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Elimination or Revision? 
Now that we have seen two different eliminativist positions – the Churchlands claim that FP is 
radically false and Griffiths claim that the vernacular categories do not single out natural kinds 
– it is worth while to point out some common nontrivial confusions and misunderstandings 
often contributed to the eliminativist position. Some have taken eliminativism to mean that the 
mental as such should be eliminated. This is, of course, not what is meant by elimination. Just 
changing the way we talk does not necessary remove the revised referents of the terms from the 
world. Ontologically speaking what there is is there, no matter how we talk about it.  
Changing from a theory that says that stars move in crystalline spheres to a better 
informed theory that makes no references to crystalline spheres or superlunary objects, does not 
remove the shine, or the movement of the stars. What is changed is how we perceive the 
movement of the stars, and what we think makes them shine.    
But, there is no way to be sure that the current mode of talking about those items is the 
best way to capture and describe the reality we are trying so hard to cope with, indeed there is 
no way to guarantee that there is anything that would count as a best description. This is the 
vital lessons to be learned from pragmatism and eliminativism: we should always be willing to 
revise our vocabularies in order to better talk about the world; that is, we should not be afraid of 
trying to refine our tools for coping with the world, in order to make them better answer our 
needs and interests.130  Consciousness and emotions will most likely always play an integral 
part in understanding and predicting humans, but how we describe the mental and how it relates 
to our bodies will always be open for revision.   
The position of eliminative materialism has often been accused of being a too 
materialistic theory not sensitive to the “real” issues, humans and their place in the world. The 
fear is that if the framework of Folk Psychology is eliminated or displaced, a scanty picture of 
the humans is left. This is the heart of the “de-humanization” objection, but I think it is a 
motivating factor for all objectors to Eliminative Materialism. What is feared is that it is not 
only the folk psychological vocabulary that is the object of elimination, but humanity as such.  
This, I think, is a common misunderstanding among those who write and criticize the 
eliminativist position. But a proper, charitable, reading of the eliminativist position reveals that 
it does not imply anything similar to such dehumanization. On the contrary, at the heart of the 
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eliminativist position lies a wish for a better understanding of how human behavior and their 
social interaction, that is the “the hope of a comparably superior social practice rooted in a 
comparably superior account of human cognition and mental activity.”131 As viewed from the 
eliminativist position this superior account of human cognition is best achieved by radically 
reformulating the rough framework of Folk Psychology, since this framework does not seem to 
meet up with the empirical standards anyone who takes it to be a serious idiom imposes on it. 
And whether or not we take it seriously does not depend on whether it is a scientific theory. In 
fact, it does not rely on the theoretical nature of FP at all. The important factor here is that it 
plays an important role in the explanation of our cognitive enterprises, and as such should be 
held accountable to the data made available by cognitive science and neuroscience. 
Despite what critics might think, then, there is an optimistic side to eliminativism. The 
eliminativist is confident that if the defective framework of FP is displaced by another and 
better one it would lead to enhanced understanding of our place in the world.   
The main difference between the eliminativist and the pragmatist is that the pragmatist 
adheres to the idea – originating from Davidson – that an explanation of any causal relation in 
the world falls under some particular kind of description, and that kinds of description may be 
distinguished by reference to interest. This is what the vocabulary-vocabulary is meant to 
capture. Different interests are instantiated by different vocabularies and different interest 
makes us choose different vocabularies.  The upshot of this reasoning is that what looks like a 
perfectly good explanation in one domain – that is, a description made by one particular 
vocabulary – might look highly dubious in another. This is especially true if the interests in the 
second vocabulary are orthogonal to the original one.  
 What the eliminativist urges is that we have to rethink how we perceive the mental. She 
wants to see a better informed theory of the mind, since the current theory fails, according to 
the eliminativist, to accommodate all the new evidence neuroscience has provided the last thirty 
or so years.  
The pragmatist does not think there is anything called a “perfect description”, different 
kinds of explanations require different descriptions and the descriptions of different causal 
relations are useful for different reasons. And as such it is in the interest of the pragmatist to 
articulate an alternative version of kinds that is sensitive to these pragmatic concerns. 
It might be wrong to conclude, as the Churchlands do, that Folk Psychology – or the 
intentional vocabulary – is vacuous by making an analogy with other scientific developments 
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made during the history of science. Newtonian physics was indeed wrong in many areas 
(especially when it comes to objects traveling at extremely high velocities), but it still has great 
heuristic value, and is accurate within a very large range.  It still works on acceleration of 
“normal” seized objects, and objects traveling at “normal” velocity, although it is not literally 
true – “literally true” in this context cashes out the knowledge that there are other descriptions, 
other vocabularies – in particular Einsteinian physics – that have greater explanatory scope and 
force.132 Further, there are cases where the old theory was not entirely replaced by a better 
developed theory, but rather was incorporated in it. And finally, there are cases when we have a 
better informed theory, while still retaining the old “commonsensical” framework and 
explanations. Water is defined as H20, but what is being referred to as ‘water’ in an everyday 
situation is hardly ever pure H20. What matters for the layman is that the substance in question 
retains some of the important functions that we usually contribute to water: it must be liquid 
(well, ice is in some sense solid water, but this is not a complicating factor since it is referred to 
as ‘ice’), is potable, can be used to extinguish fires, gets you wet, etc. 133 
It might be that what we now mean when we use one of the mentalistic terms is not 
what the term will refer to when neuroscience has matured, but this is an empirical question 
that should not worry us very much. The legitimacy of the intentional vocabulary is not secured 
by the success of a reductive program, whether it is of the “translation” form or of the 
“disappearance” form.134 Its legitimacy derives from its contribution to our everyday effort at 
trying to explain and predict other humans.  
There are different situations that would call for the elimination of a vocabulary. One 
situation, the first situation is when we come to realize that some of the functions of the 
vocabulary are misguided; that is, sometimes through vocabulary changes we change our view 
of what needs to be explained. This is what the Churchlands are arguing for: the 
commonsensical framework of the mental does not fulfill the needs of a scientific account of 
the mental. But this overlooks the fact that the FP is not constructed to fulfill scientific 
functions. The other situation that would call for elimination would be the case where the new 
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replacing classificatory scheme would guarantee to fulfill all the explanatory, inductive and 
other functions of the theory. However, even though the explanatory needs might be fulfilled 
there are still other things we do with the intentional vocabulary that run parallel to the needs of 
the neuroscientist. We use the intentional vocabulary to manipulate and affect other people. It is 
unlikely that this practical function of the intentional vocabulary is to be reduced to a purely 
physical vocabulary.  As Griffiths says: “When it can be shown that the explanatory and 
inductive potential of two schemes overlap, so that neither can subsume the other, then both 
must be retained and they are not in genuine competition.”135  
This is not to say that the intentional vocabulary is irreducible in principle, it is just that 
the needs and interests, which features we take to be salient, of neuroscience differ quite 
substantially from the needs of everyday interaction with other beings in our environment. 
Empirical discoveries, cognitive research and neuroscience, may reveal that there is no 
single object or single description in neuroscientific language that fully covers a term in Folk 
Psychology, but this does not imply that the term has to be eliminated from the vocabulary of 
Folk Psychology.  It means only that it has no role to play in a in a neuro-scientific account of 
how the mind works.136 In time it might be that Folk Psychology will revise its vocabulary 
accordingly, but this is not necessary, especially when the heuristic value of Folk Psychology is 
considered.  
Consider two extremes of a heuristic spectrum: Newtonian physics and witches. 
Newtonian physics though not strictly literally true still can have immense practical and 
theoretical value: “Newton’s simple mechanics (the three laws of motion plus the gravitational 
laws) is strictly false as judged from the perspective of Einstein’s more penetrating mechanics. 
But it would be entirely too precious and puritanical to insist that the former be eliminated in 
favor of the latter in all practical contexts”.137   
At the other end of the heuristic specter are concepts like witches. Although witches no 
longer play a part in a (scientific or otherwise serious) ontological catalogue the term is still in 
use, as a negative remark, as a part of a fantasy movie or book, or as something you can dress 
up as on Halloween, and most importantly it plays an important part in explaining why several 
thousand women were killed between the fourteenth century and late eighteenth century.138 
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7. Concluding remarks 
Let us return to the question asked in chapter two. What does it mean to say that we are giving 
different descriptions of the same thing? 
In the current popular literature on the relation between the mind and the brain – see, for 
instance, Schwartz (2002) LeDoux (2002 Damasio (1999), Koch (2004), Quartz and Sejnowski 
(2002) – there is a tendency to jump between the different modes of explanation. In one breath 
they use mentalistic terms – they use words like thinking, feeling, emoting etc – and then in the 
next breath they use the terms of the neuroscientist – neurons, synapses, dopamine, etc. They 
all make use of the intentional vocabulary alongside with the neuroscientific vocabulary, but 
they do not give a detailed description of what the relationship between the two consists of. The 
conceptual analysis theorist might say that this way of trying to explain the relation between 
mind and brain is logically off the mark and that the product is nonsense.  
The confusion here lies in the fact that the vocabulary of neuroscience and the 
intentional vocabulary mimic each other. Neuroscientists use terms from the vernacular and 
give them new content, and as people learn more about the new findings of neuroscience, they 
too incorporate some of the new meanings into their commonsensical framework. This, in turn, 
makes it hard to evaluate the categories of the different vocabularies. And it makes it more 
challenging to evaluate whether the reasons for elimination, offered by Griffiths and the 
Churchlands, are sound. Griffiths notes that “categories that need to be eliminated are more 
usually ones whose apparent causal homeostasis results from their approximating some other 
category with real causal homeostasis. Replacing the crude approximation with the category 
that is doing the actual work is pure epistemic gain. Retaining the old category would not be 
pluralistic, but merely foolish.”139 In the present context this observation brings new force to 
the Churchlandish question of the whether folk psychological terms should be eliminated or not. 
That is, is it the case that FP just piggybacks on another and better theory, neuroscience,  
(which is, in essence, what Churchland claims), or is it a way of clustering together properties 
that are not relevant to the questions asked by neuroscientists, but which deserve answers in 
their own right? 
For the pragmatist there is no way to articulate a principled or universal method that 
gives means to choose one vocabulary over another when the two are in direct conflict. The 
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solution to the conflict will vary from case to case. One problem with attempts to employ such 
a genuine method is that it is always possible to articulate more than a single such method.  
This, of course, is a consequence of the idea that different vocabularies instantiate different 
interests and there is no way to tell which of our interests in the current domain of inquiry is 
correct. As a consequence there is little hope, from the pragmatist point of view, in deciding at 
the present which of the two kinds of descriptions, the mental or the physical, is the one the 
neuroscientist or the lay persons should use.  
However, this is not something that should raise a philosophical worry. On the contrary, 
as Ramberg points out140, it seems to be a consequence of a systematic evasion of having to 
choose one over the other. It helps bringing the narrative vocabulary and the neurobiological 
vocabularies closer. The correct stories of our cognitive and subjective capacities are not based 
on either the intentional, narrative vocabulary or the physical, biological vocabulary. They are 
in this respect equally suited to capture the true story of our mental lives, and none of them are 
currently disposable, since they both play important and different parts in our cognitive 
endeavors.  
Ramberg suggests that the vocabulary currently used by neuroscientists and cognitive 
scientists, is best viewed as an interface-vocabulary trying to match up two different domains of 
inquiry. It is sensitive both to the scientific need of the physically based sciences, such as 
neuroscience, and other needs and constraints, such as the normative commitments of the 
intentional vocabulary. 
By following Griffiths in his understanding of natural kinds it is possible to argue that 
the physical, neuroscientific vocabulary and the intentional vocabulary can and should exist 
side by side since his approach to natural kinds “embodies the realization that there is more 
structure in the world than can be captured by a single taxonomy of nature.”141 Currently the 
intentional and the physical vocabulary seem to have equal right to exist since they explain 
quite different aspects of human undertakings. However, this does not preclude the idea that 
they are in some way continuous and dependent on each other.   
Griffiths notes that “The current received view is that the dynamics of physical systems 
can only be adequately captured using a hierarchy of theoretical vocabularies, each irreducible 
to the vocabularies below it. Irreducibility is guaranteed by the fact that descriptions in on 
vocabulary can be made true by indefinitely many arrangements of the structures described in 
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lower-level vocabularies.” 142 If this is true of physical systems, then it must be equally true 
when it comes to the dynamics between vocabularies intended to capture purely physical 
phenomena and those that display the normative obligations we, as language users, share with 
those in our community. 
If the argument provided above is correct then there is no way to make an isomorphic 
map of the intentional vocabulary upon the physical (or the other way around). There will 
always be some residue left that the reduction cannot account for. This again reflects the 
different interests that guide the different vocabularies of the different levels of inquiry. Some 
of the questions posed at the top level will be meaningless at the lower and vice versa. This is 
not to say that some concepts cannot change levels. When we learn more about the brain it is 
likely that some of the questions that we face at one level of analysis will have answers on 
another level. But when this happens, this will also, to some degree, represent a reinterpretation 
of the original question.   
The idea that it is possible to make a distinction between what counts as the 
philosophical and what counts as the scientific part of a problem, seems highly implausible to 
the pragmatist. The pragmatist thinks that philosophical activity is parasitic on, and a response 
to, changes elsewhere in culture and society and cannot, as such, be singled out as an 
autonomous type of inquiry. The idea, therefore, that philosophical questions – in this context, 
conceptual questions – are prior to empirical and scientific ones is doubtful.   
For the pragmatist there is no way to make sense of the notion that some modes of 
inquiry are typically scientific and others are non-scientific. That is, there is no principled way 
to distinguish be between science as demarcated by ontological responsibility and science as 
search for systematicity and generality in explanation. 
There is, for the pragmatist, nothing “out there” that makes a particular kind of 
description more “correct” than any of the alternative true descriptions. The world does not by 
itself provide criteria one can turn to that tell us whether one description of the world is more 
suitable or closer to the objective, non-human-dependent nature of reality than another. What 
matters is whether or not the description is useful, and whether it yields a grasp of the world 
that advances our current interests in the domain of inquiry. However, this should not be taken 
to mean that the pragmatist endorses the idea that “anything goes”. We are causally constrained 
by the world, and we seek to articulate real patterns.  
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The pragmatist insists that, when it comes to revealing our cognitive interests, the level 
of analysis should not be separate sentences and their relation, or the logical relation between 
words in that sentence. Vocabularies as a whole are where such interests are embedded, and 
where changes in interests come to expression.  This makes us realize, for example, that “the 
fact that Newton’s vocabulary lets us predict the world more easily than Aristotle’s does not 
mean that the world speaks Newtonian.”143 It is not the world as such that changes, but what we 
take to be salient features of the world. And these salient features are what we try to capture, 
both in the scientific vocabularies and the intentional vocabulary.  
 
Natural Kinds and Trans-theoretic Identity 
Another important implication of this liberal notion of natural kind and conceptual change is 
that it captures the idea of trans-theoretic identity. It is possible to make intelligible the claim 
that when we refer to stars they are the same objects as the ancients referred to even though 
they talked about fixed objects on the crystal spheres of heaven, while we talk about massive 
incandescent gaseous objects traveling through empty space at very high velocities. The 
underlying causal mechanism assures that a vital component of the meaning of a term is 
retained across radical shifts in theory. There is no incommensurability barring the identity of 
our stars with those of the ancient peoples. This idea is in opposition to the idea that radically 
different scientific paradigms are incommensurable, and that the basic terms of conflicting 
paradigms do not refer to the same things.  
If natural kinds are thought of to provide some way of classifying similar instances and 
objects to the same class, without being thought of to provide and support universal laws, but 
retain some sensitivity to historical changes and essence, it is possible to have radical changes 
in the scientific changes that do not imply incommensurability. The account of natural kinds 
Griffiths offers is able to accommodate for such changes in what we take to be the salient 
features of the world. 
If we allow kind-talk to be flexible and to take note of – indeed react to – empirical 
discoveries and changes in the way we think of the world, scientific progress and intertheoretic 
reduction would become a much simpler and more commonplace process. When we see that 
the ontic commitments of our scientific theories are not absolute it will make us more at ease 
with the idea that theories come and go and that what is perceived as the best explanation in a 
domain today may radically change tomorrow. The search for natural kinds is an open-ended, 
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ongoing and empirical epistemological project: “a natural kind concept is a concept that it 
makes sense to seek to clarify through empirical inquiry. Such concepts are ongoing projects of 
inquiry in which extension and intension are altered to preserve inductive and explanatory 
power.”144  
This realization also makes it easier to accept the way theoretical concepts in science are 
revised as theory change. This, of course, has been a major problem for the philosophy of 
science for decades. By denying the conceptual analysis approach that takes the current 
understanding and ordinary use of a term to exhaust the meaning of the given term, 
reconceptualization becomes one of the chief methods to cash out epistemological gains from 
theory change, instead of being a headache for philosophers and a way for strong relativists to 
claim that changes in the way we speak about the world alter it in a somewhat radical and 
ontological speaking fundamental way. There are changes taking place, for sure, but those are 
not radically changing what there is (understood in an ontological committing way), they 




The consequence I would like to draw from this discussion is that the current situation does not 
call for the elimination of Folk Psychology. It might not be the best suited vocabulary for 
neuroscience, but as the situation is currently there would seem to be little hope of reducing it 
entirely (reducing it away or what Rorty calls the “disappearance” version of the Identity 
Theory145). The interests that guide the two opposites in the tug-of-war, the scientific use of the 
intentional vocabulary and the rough and ready use of it we rely on to make useful predictions 
about our fellow humans, are not the same. The scientist needs a vocabulary that contains terms 
that are projectable and are useful in making predictions from observed instances to unobserved 
instances. We non-scientists do not have that need for the intentional vocabulary. In this respect 
the position I have lined up here is analogous to the “Ryle-Dennett view that when we use a 
mentalistic terminology we are simply using an efficient vocabulary – the vocabulary 
characteristic of what Dennett calls the “intentional stance” – to predict what an organism is 
likely to do or say under various sets of circumstances.”146  The intentional vocabulary provides 
an immensely powerful tool for predicting human and other animal (and sometimes other 
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organisms’) behavior. Churchland is right when he claims that the current way we use Folk 
Psychology might not be the best for scientific purposes, but it seems odd, from the pragmatist 
perspective, to articulate this point by claiming that the terms of FP do not refer to “anything 
real”, like caloric fluid or phlogiston.  
The upshot, then, is that the pragmatist does not see the current problems in 
neuroscience as consisting of just conceptual confusion. There are other issues at stake; not 
only bad application of more or less good concepts – an ailment that might be solved by 
armchair philosophy and conceptual analysis. Rather, it would be more to the point to 
characterize the situation as a “mismatch between important human interests and some of the 
tools with which we are pursuing them”147 And this is where the philosopher might do some 
important work, since: “[l]ike the engineer and the lawyer, the philosopher is useful in solving 
particular problems that arise in particular situations – situations in which the language of the 
past is in conflict with the needs of the future.” 148 The philosopher’s job, contrary to the 
conceptual analysis theorist’s claim, is not to sort out the logical tangle (or conceptual 
confusion) of conflicting concepts, and then subsequently leave the empirical confusions to the 
scientist, but rather to be able to see the conflict raging between needs expressed in an old 
vocabulary and the needs expressed in a new vocabulary that try to explain and describe the 
same relations in the world.  
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